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ARTICLES
Racial Insults and Free Speech
Within the University
J. PETER BYRNE*

I.

INTRODUCTION

For several years universities have been troubled by disturbing incidents of
racial insults and harassment. Most often, these incidents involve verbal or
symbolic abuse of black students by white students at predominantly white
schools, often some of the nation's most elite universities. University administrators and faculty have uniformly denounced such harassment. They have
disagreed, however, on whether universities should take disciplinary action
against students who use racially offensive speech. Those who favor disciplinary action argue that minority students' claims for racial justice from institutions that long barred or slighted them, and which still reflect the
ascendancy of white males, are an appropriate basis for the discipline of ra•cially offensive speech. Those who oppose disciplinary action often argue
that punishing racially insulting speech and behavior would violate the principles of free expression inherent in both academic freedom and the first
amendment.
This article examines the constitutionality of university prohibitions of
public expression that insults members of the academic community by directing hatred or contempt toward them on account of their race. I Several
thoughtful scholars have examined generally whether the government can
penalize citizens for racist slurs under the first amendment, but to the limited
extent that they have discussed university disciplinary codes they have assumed that the state university is merely a government instrumentality subject to the same constitutional limitations as, for example, the legislature or
the police. 2 In contrast, I argue that the university has a fundamentally dif* Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. Thanks go to Anita Allen and L.
Michael Seidman for helpful comments on an earlier draft, to participants at a Faculty Workshop at
Georgetown University Law Center for a bracing mixture of support and criticism, and to Dorothy
Kim and Timothy Maguire for valuable research assistance.
1. Although I focus on racial insults, my analysis pertains equally to insults based on nationality,
gender, or sexual preference.
2. See generally Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982); Downs, Skokie Revisited: Hate Group
Speech and the First Amendment, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 629 (1985); Greenawalt, Insults and
Epithets: Are They ProtectedSpeech?, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 287 (1990); Matsuda, Public Response
to Racist Speech: Consideringthe Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989); Note, A Communi-
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ferent relationship to the speech of its members than does the state to the
speech of its citizens. On campus, general rights of free speech should be
qualified by the intellectual values of academic discourse. I conclude that the
protection of these academic values, which themselves enjoy constitutional
protection, permits state universities lawfully to bar racially abusive speech,
even if the state legislature could not constitutionally prohibit such speech
throughout society at large. At the same time, however, I assert that the first
amendment renders state universities powerless to punish speakers for advocating any idea in a reasoned manner.
It is necessary at the outset to choose a working definition of a racial insult. This definition, however, is necessarily provisional; any such definition
implies the writer's views on the boundaries of constitutionally protected offensive speech, and the reader cannot be expected to swallow the definition
until she has had the opportunity to inspect the writer's constitutional premises. Having offered such a caution, I define a racial insult as a verbal or
symbolic expression by a member of one ethnic group that describes another
ethnic group or an individual member of another group in terms conventionally derogatory, that offends members of the target group, and that a reasonable and unbiased observer, who understands the meaning of the words and
the context of their use, would conclude was purposefully or recklessly abusive. Excluded from this definition are expressions that convey rational but
offensive propositions that can be disputed by argument and evidence. An
insult, so conceived, refers to a manner of speech that seeks to demean rather
than to criticize, and to appeal to irrational fears and prejudices rather than
3
to respect for others and informed judgment.
This article seeks simultaneously to clarify a current and difficult question
of constitutional law and to advance a more general approach to student free
speech claims. This dual purpose can lead to problems. On the one hand,
the phenomenon of racial insults on campus deserves serious consideration
and ought not be handled merely as the exemplar of a general theory. On the
other hand, too exclusive an attention to racial insults can spawn interpretations of the first amendment tailored only to a preferred policy outcome that
slights other troubling implications of the analysis. These problems should
be addressed in due course. It is worth stating here that it was consideration
of the appropriateness of university prohibition of racial insults, as a member
of a Georgetown University committee drafting a student speech and expression policy, that led me to conclude that orthodox views regarding the free
tarian Defense of Group Libel Laws, 101 HARv. L. REv. 682 (1988); Note, Group Vilification Reconsidered, 89 YALE L.J. 308 (1979).
3. As an example of a racial insult within my definition, consider the words "Niggers Suck"
spray painted on a wall. This expression, of course, does not purport to convey any information or
proposition other than a speaker's strong emotions of contempt.
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speech rights of students at universities were inadequate.4 This reconsideration occurred at a time when I was trying to formulate a general understanding of the special character of free speech in higher education. 5 Thus, I am
content to view this article as an application of my general understanding to
a specific problem; the general understanding would not have taken the form
it has, however, had I not been worried about this specific problem.
The article proceeds as follows: In Part 11, I briefly describe the problem
of racially offensive speech in the university, the prevalent understanding of
the degree to which racial slander may be prohibited generally by government, and the consequent forms of regulations some schools have adopted.
This Part also briefly discusses the scholarly treatment of general prohibitions of racial insults. The brevity of this discussion is justified by my focus
on the radical difference between the ability of the university and the general
government to regulate speech. This Part concludes that realistic doubts
about the capacity of our political institutions to draw defensible moral limits
on speech may justify constitutional restraints on general prohibitions of racial insults, but that these restraints lead to regrettably weak regulation. In
Part III, I argue that the nature of the university both justifies broader restrictions on racial insults and requires full protection of propositions about
race or other sensitive subjects that may offend some but which are stated in
rational form. In Part IV, I discuss the application of my view of the nature
of the university and academic freedom to current Supreme Court doctrine
regarding student speech. Finally, in Part V, I conclude by suggesting prudential limits on the university's regulation of the speech of its members.
II.

RACIALLY OFFENSIVE SPEECH: THE PREVAILING VIEWS

By now most are weary with disgust from reading press accounts of white
students verbally or symbolically insulting minority students. These insults
include terms of racial denigration shouted and spray-painted, crude caricatures of racial facial features displayed on posters or mimicked in white sorority girls' party make-up, and ancient stereotypes applied to individuals
and groups in student newspapers and campus radio broadcasts. 6 Exper4. Although the policy that was adopted by Georgetown guaranteed student rights of free speech
generally analogous to those specified for public institutions by the first amendment, it allowed an
exception (subject to somewhat ambiguous treatment) for "expression... grossly offensive on matters such as race, ethnicity, religion, gender, or sexual preference." Georgetown University Office of
Student Affairs, Community Matters, at 3 (January 1989). This formulation strikes me now as too
broad, but the narrower reach intended by the committee still seems correct.
5. See generally Byrne, Academic Freedom A "Special Concern of the First Amendment," 99
YALE L.J. 251 (1989).

6. See, e.g., Gibbs, Bigots in the Ivory Tower-An Alarming Rise in Hatred Roils US. Campuses,
TIME, May 7, 1990, at 104; Sowell, The New Racism on Campus, FORTUNE, Feb. 13, 1989, at 115;
Asians at University of Minnesota Receive Racist Letter, CHRONICLE HIGHER EDUC., May 2, 1990,

402

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 79:399

ienced observers of the nation's campuses believe this spate of abuse to be
unprecedented in frequency and intensity. 7 In the lifetimes of current educators, universities have been more welcoming to racial diversity than has society as a whole; this racist backlash mocks our hope that education will
temper racial animosity.
What constitutional status can racial insults claim in society at large? At
first blush, one might be surprised that the first amendment protects insults
to individuals or groups at all. Not even the staunchest supporter of the
most absolute view of first amendment protection argues that racial insults
have any significant social or individual value. 8 Female and minority writers
and witnesses have chronicled in moving terms the hurt and alienation that
such insults inflict. 9 Moreover, the denial of a legal remedy against the perpetrators of vilification of minorities lends credence to the view that whitedominated institutions comfortably tolerate racism through complicity or insensitivity. The spread of this view saps the strength of societal institutions,
already frustrated in pursuit of service to all, by weakening confidence in
them by an important constituency. Finally, and not least important, racial
insults, which are absurd as well as demoralizing, lower the standard of discourse about difficult and important issues to that of the least reflective and
constructive members of the community.
The case for protecting racist speech against general governmental prohibition or punishment must stand on pessimism about the ability of a pluralistic and democratic society to censor any form of expression without
degenerating into an attempt to suppress political opposition or cultural differences.' 0 This argument has two constituent parts. First, government has
at A3, col. 1; Fraternity Suspended for Sexist Newsletter, CHRONICLE HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 28,
1990, at A3, col.1; Berger, Deep RacialDivisions Persistin New Generationat College, N.Y. Times,
May 22, 1989, at A1, col. 1. For a summary of newspaper accounts of incidents of conflict and
violence related to intolerance on American campuses between 1986 and 1988, see H. EHRLICH,
CAMPUS ETHNOVIOLENCE AND THE POLICY OFrIONS 41-72 (1990).
7. See Racism Flares on Campus, TIME, Dec. 8, 1980, at 28.
8. Racial insults do call attention to racial tensions, just as a stench calls attention to water
pollution or itchy red dots to a bacterial infection of the skin. But our ability to interpret such
symptoms does not transform the underlying phenomena into expression with any intellectual or
aesthetic value. Moreover, racial insults not only signal racial tensions, they inflame them, sometimes turning passive distrust into active hostility.
9. See Allen, On Being a Role Model, BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. (forthcoming 1990); Matsuda,
supra note 2, at 2320-21; Lawrence, CHRONICLE HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 25, 1989, at B1, col. 3;
Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of FingerpaintingAs the Law's Response
to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 139-45 (1987).
10. Professor Schauer discusses in philosophical terms the argument from governmental incompetence in F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 73-86 (1982). He concludes
that:
freedom of speech is based in large part on a distrust of the ability of government to make
the necessary distinctions, a distrust of governmental determinations of truth and falsity,
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no acceptable criteria for distinguishing between valuable and worthless
speech. Even a well-meaning censor cannot in principle distinguish between
an insult and a good faith assertion that is controversial and offensive to
members of a racial group, such as a speech arguing that affirmative action
has damaged performance in some city offices because blacks with substandard test scores have been hired. Second, the implementation of governmental criteria will most likely become an expression of the political goals of the
group that controls the censor's office. For example, it has been argued that
efforts to suppress racial insults in universities reflect the political power of
minorities in universities controlled by a liberal elite, and that liberals and
minorities should be concerned that the same forms of censorship will be
used against them if conservatives gain control of the universities.11
This argument is formidable both in practice and in principle. One need
only refer to the current controversy about the National Endowment for the
Arts sponsorship of "obscene" artistic displays to demonstrate how likely it
is that censorship will be incompetent and politically motivated. 12 Much of
the lingering opposition to prohibitions on pornography stems from memories of government agents seizing copies of Ulysses and Lady Chatterly's
Lover.' 3 The specter of Joe McCarthy and the House Un-American Activities Committee still haunts our notions of academic freedom.' 4 These bad
experiences only confirm in practice what liberals have long argued in principle: no official orthodoxy should prescribe what citizens may say on any
issue.' 5 Within the confines of the Constitution and the law, government
holds only to the preferences held by shifting majorities. The bright side of
this tradition is the citizen's broad liberty to express herself; the dark side is
an appreciation of the fallibility of political leaders, and a somewhat deeper distrust of
governmental power in a more general sense.
Id. at 86. I would extend the distrust beyond government officials and structures to the sporadic
will of the heterogenous democratic polity.
11. See Dershowitz, Campus Speech Control, Wash. Times, May 3, 1989, at F4, col. 1; cf. Finn,
The Campus: An Island of Repression in a Sea of Freedom, COMMENTARY, Sept. 1989, at 17, 18
(arguing that "muzzling" of views within the university is pursued because of the liberal ideology of
diversity).
12. See Weinraub, Arts Agency Issues Obscenity Guidelines, Wash. Post, July 11, 1990, at Cl, col.
I.
13. See Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (Lady Chatterly's
Lover), aff'd, 276 F.2d 433 (2d. Cir. 1960); United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses", 5 F. Supp.
182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
14. See Dershowitz, supra note 11, at F4, col. 2 ("Many forget, or are unaware of, how recently
McCarthyism dominated college campuses."). See generally E. SCHRECKER, No IVORY TOWER:
MCCARTHYISM AND THE UNIVERSMES (1986).
15. Justice Jackson gave the most memorable judicial statement of this view in an opinion strik-

ing down a compulsory flag-salute law: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation,
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,

religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 79:399

the government's lack of moral principle and authority. Governmental criteria for placing some forms of expression beyond the pale are suspect not
simply because individual censors may be stupid or venal, but because democratic governments lack permanent commitments to determinate moral values from which a censor could derive acceptable criteria for regulating
speech. Our insistence on free speech stems not so much from optimism
about the emergence of truth from open debate as from realistic pessimism
about the character of representative government. Thus, the argument
against regulating racist speech primarily cautions against the precedential
effect of permitting censorship.
Leading cases on the protection for other types of offensive speech bear out
this emphasis on the incompetence of the censor. The Supreme Court's opinion in Cohen v. California16 deserves particular mention, both because it is
such an excellent opinion and because the case typifies the era in which student free speech principles were developed. Cohen was arrested for wearing
in a courthouse a jacket bearing the message, "Fuck the Draft." The
Supreme Court held that his consequent conviction for "offensive conduct"
violated the first amendment. 17 In his opinion for the Court, Justice Harlan
rejected the State's argument that it could constitutionally punish "public
utterance of this unseemly expletive in order to maintain what [it] regard[s]
as a suitable level of discourse within the body politic.""' Harlan wrote that
in a "diverse and populous society" such as the United States, "no readily
ascertainable general principle exists" for the state to decide which expressions should be prohibited. 19 After all, "one man's vulgarity is another
man's lyric. Indeed, we think it largely because governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions in this area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individual." 20 Cultural pluralism and
relativity of values deprive the state of any legitimacy in seeking to limit the
forms of speech in order to strengthen overall communication. 2 1 Because the
censor cannot know what manner of speech most effectively communicates
ideas to people of differing cultures and abilities, it has no principled basis for
16. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).

17. Id. at 16, 26.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 23.
Id at 24, 25.
Id. at 25.
Justice Harlan also acknowledged that expletives have strong "emotive" force that "may

often be the more important element of the overall message sought to be communicated," and that
the first amendment protects the speaker's choice of any emotionally provocative word. Id. at 26.
To the extent that the first amendment protects emotional utterances from solicitude for the benefit
of the individual's interest in self-expression, it seems anomalous to protect the incendiary venting
of emotions of racial hatred and contempt. See supra note 8. In any event, appropriate regard for
the speaker's emotional satisfaction may properly have less weight within a distinctly intellectual
community like a university.
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outlawing any form of speech. Harlan follows his appraisal of governmental
incompetence to censor with a warning about the dangers of bad faith: "Indeed, governmental units might soon seize upon the censorship of particular
words as a convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopular
views."' 22 Thus, Cohen relies on a view of the state as an institution at once
without moral commitments sufficient to provide justifiable criteria for
prohibiting certain forms of speech, and subject to popular control such that
prohibition of any form of speech likely will entail the pursuit of the political
program of whatever majority might temporarily gain control of government
machinery.
These concerns also predominate in the recent flag desecration cases. 23 In
twice holding that statutory prohibitions against burning or otherwise mutilating the national flag (a form of protest uniquely offensive to some Americans) violate the first amendment, the Supreme Court has emphasized the
political dangers inherent in sanctioning regulation of particularly offensive
speech. "If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it
is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable. '24 The Court
reasoned that the special ideological value attached to the flag both gave protected status to the expressive act of burning the flag and precluded the government from insisting that the flag be reserved for approved meanings. 25 To
justify disabling the government from reserving the flag for certain meanings,
the Court emphasized both the government's incompetence for this task and
the dangers of political manipulation:
To conclude that the Government may permit designated symbols to be
used to communicate only a limited set of messages would be to enter territory having no discernible or defensible boundaries.... In evaluating these
choices [among symbols] under the First Amendment, how would we decide which symbols were sufficiently special to warrant this unique status?
To do so, we would be forced to consult our own political preferences, and
impose them on the citizenry, in the very way that the First Amendment
26
forbids us to do.
Again, the government (including the Supreme Court) has no transcendent
commitment that justifies prohibiting flag desecration as a manner of expression. Consequently, any such prohibition must be in furtherance of mere
"political preferences."
22. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
23. United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
24. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2544; Eichman, I10 S. Ct. at 2411 (quoting Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at

2544).
25. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2546-48.
26. Id. at 2546.
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27
In dicta at the end of the second flag desecration case, the Supreme
Court includes "virulent ethnic and religious epithets" among the offensive
expressions that government cannot prohibit. 28 One is tempted to surmise
from this phrase that Justice Brennan was consciously pretermitting the controversy over regulation of racial insults. The warning was hardly necessary. The flag burning cases are merely the most conspicuous of the many
decisions based on the principle that government cannot prohibit speech because it is stupid, offensive, pernicious, or threatening to widely held social
values such ais equal opportunity and racial justice. 29 Commentators who
have urged regulation of racial insults have sought to find or fashion space
within this structure for the prohibition of racial insults. Two approaches
predominate. One is to fit the prohibition within the "fighting words" exception to first amendment protection. 30 The other is to argue that racist insults
are a uniquely damaging form of speech which justify a new departure from
31
the above strictures.
The "fighting words" doctrine encompasses direct, scurrilous verbal abuse
of an individual or small group likely to incite an immediate breach of the
peace. 32 Although the Supreme Court has placed fighting words outside the
protection of the first amendment, it has also narrowed the definition of this
category of speech over time. 33 For speech to fall within the fighting words
exception, the Court requires that it have little or no social value and that the
34
prohibition be justified by realistic concerns about a breach of the peace,
not by official antipathy to the content of the speech.
Advocates of regulation of racist insults have struggled with the latter requirement. It is common ground that racist insults have little or no value as
expression. But it has proven difficult to satisfy the requirement that the
speech bring on an imminent breach of the peace. Obviously, a racist insult
may be fighting words if delivered to a target able and inclined to answer
27. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990).
28. Id. at 2410.
29. See American Booksellers Ass'n. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 332 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding
Indianapolis pornography law unconstitutional), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986); Collin v. Smith, 578
F.2d 1197, 1207 (7th Cir.) (holding restrictions on Nazi march through Skokie, Illinois, unconstitutional), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978); see also Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 5 (1949) (city
ordinance forbidding any breach of the peace unconstitutional as applied to speech).
30. See Delgado, supra note 2, at 173 & n. 241; Downs, supra note 2, at 631-36; Grey, Responding to Abusive Speech on Campus A Model Statute, RECONSTRUCTION, Winter, 1990, at 50.
31. See Matsuda, supra note 2, at 2356-61; Note, A CommunitarianDefense of Group Libel Laws,
supra note 2, at 690-92; Note, Group Vilification Reconsidered,supra note 2, at 312-14.
32. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
33. See, e.g., Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 913
(1972); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 910 (1972); Goodin v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972);
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
34. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518
(1972).
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with violence. But advocates of regulation understandably want to prohibit
racially offensive speech in circumstances in which the targets will not respond with violence. The approach taken by advocates of regulation, therefore, has been to emphasize a harm resulting directly from the scurrilous
expression that is analogous to a breach of the peace, such as the listener's
severe emotional distress or feeling of loss of social equality. 35 In the context
of the university, the harm has been portrayed as the creation of a hostile
36
environment that denies the student target equal educational opportunity.
This argument has moral weight and legal plausibility, at least when the insult is directed at a specific victim who suffers demonstrable harm. But for
published, broadcast, or diffuse insults, the harms suffered do not call for
government intervention as insistently as do words sparking physical violence. Government cannot sit by while its citizens fight each other; government can sit by while parties attempt to explain the nature of the emotional
or social injury they have suffered from hearing offensive comments. Moreover, public certification of the seriousness of the listener's injury is inseparable from public evaluation of the acceptability of the speaker's message-the
very determination that liberals do not wish government ever to make. 37 Despite these flaws, however, regulations treating racist insults like fighting
words have been the most prevalent and least controversial in the university
38
setting.
Efforts to regulate racially offensive speech have also sought to resuscitate
the tort of group libel, at least when the speech is directed toward a "captive"
audience. 39 Group libel is defined as the depiction of the "depravity, crimi35. See Greenawalt, supra note 2, at 294-300; Grey, supra note 30, at 53. The common law still
does not permit tort recovery for racial insults without proof of aggravating circumstances, such as
the defendant's holding authority over the plaintiff. See Dawson v. Zayre Dep't Stores, 346 Pa.
Super. 357, 361-62, 499 A.2d 648, 650 (1985).
36. See infra note 69 and accompanying text. Even the American Civil Liberties Union agrees
that universities should prohibit "sexually demeaning or derogatory comments... directed at a
specific student or gender [that] have definable consequences for the student that demonstrably
hinders his or her learning experiences as a student." ACLU Policy Guide No. 72.
37. This difficulty can be illustrated by considering Professor Kent Greenawalt's ingenious principle of "equalization of victims." Greenawalt, supra note 2, at 297. Professor Greenawalt notes
with concern the unfair consequences of using the imminent threat of violence as the criterion for
punishing speech when the victims of the speech are women, children, or the elderly who may wish
to respond but are intimidated by their physical inequality with their tormentor. He suggests that
the court determine if "remarks of that sort in that context would cause many listeners" to react
violently. Id. at 298. This assumes, however, that a court should be concerned with the injury to
the listener rather than with a real threat of violence, an assumption consistently rejected by the
Supreme Court. Moreover, the fact-finder cannot decide whether the listener would have reacted
violently without passing a normative judgment on the insult.
38. For examples of such regulations, see the Wisconsin Policy, infra note 73, and the Stanford
policy, infra note 76.
39. See Note, A Communitarian Defense of Group Libel Laws, supra note 2, at 689-94; Note,
Group Vilification Reconsidered, supra note 2, at 325-32.
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nality, unchastity, or lack of virtue" of any social group, including a race,
which holds the group up to public contempt. ° Although in 1952 the
Supreme Court upheld the criminal conviction of a man who distributed leaflets containing an offensive verbal stereotype of blacks under the theory of
group liable, 4 1 most commentators do not believe that a federal court today
would or should permit a prosecution in similar circumstances because the
leaflets were part of an attempt to secure legislation through the political
process. 4 2 Rather, advocates of regulation have urged that speech which libels a race be punishable when targeted at a discrete set of individuals who
cannot easily avoid the insult. 43 Although on the surface this approach emphasizes the defamatory harm of the speech rather than its tendency to precipitate violence, functionally it tends to collapse into the fighting words
approach, supporting only regulation of face to face insults, which are the
most likely to lead to physical violence." The greater weakness of any group
libel approach, however, remains the failure to distinguish between offensive
statements about a group that are merely rank vilification and those that
instead represent flawed public debate which should not be suppressed.
Some arguments seeking to justify broader regulation of racist speech are
plainly untenable. For example, it has been argued that a form of group libel
based on the theoretical literature on communitarian political values should
be recognized. 4 5 The argument posits that because "group membership is a
precondition of individual autonomy," 4 6 failure to legally penalize group vili47
fication injures the personhood or social equality of the victim. This argument, however, fails to advance the discussion. If it can be said that the
victim of a racial insult belongs to a group that is the primary significance for
his "personhood," so does the speaker. In degrading the listener's racial
group, the speaker is defending his own racial group by implicitly or explic40. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 251 (1952) (quoting ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 47
(1949)).
41. Id at 266.
42. Id. at 252, 276. The leaflets petitioned for legislation and solicited members for a racist
organization. Id. at 252.
43. Grey, supra note 30, at 53. This argument is based on the "captive audience" exception to
protection of offensive speech suggested by Justice Harlan in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 2122 (1971). Cf Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (holding that ordinance prohibiting
door-to-door solicitation is unconstitutional because it substituted community judgment for individual judgment). Professor Matsuda, in arguing for a departure from current first amendment doctrine, argues that students' relationship with the university makes them a captive group that should
be given special protection. Matsuda, supra note 2, at 2372-23.
44. See Downs, supra note 2, at 683-84.
45. See generally Note, A CommunitarianDefense of Group Libel Laws, supra note 2. The student who made this argument thoroughly misconstrued the splendid literature on communitarian
political values. Reliance on the communitarian notion of group identification is clearly misguided.

46. Id. at 700.
47. Id. at 690-92.
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itly asserting its superiority. If society accepts the primacy of group identity,
by what shared values can it justify to the speaker restriction of his outspoken preference for his group to the listener's? The argument seeks to escape
this dilemma by invoking an idea of equality among groups as basic to American political life. 48 Such a notion of equality must derive from some perspective above group membership, however, and if it is allowed to limit the
claims of any group one might conclude that at least some values that transcend group membership are more significant than group values. In any
event, such emphasis on the primacy of the interests or values of involuntarily formed groups conflicts with much of the American experience, which
has emphasized liberty from the confines of inherited norms and creation of
the self. No political theory that fails to accommodate this cultural value
49
will gain many adherents for restricting freedom of expression.
Beyond seeking justification for greater regulation of speech within Supreme Court doctrine, some scholars have launched more far-reaching arguments against prevailing first amendment doctrine. These scholars argue
that the liberal political philosophy underlying first amendment doctrine depends too much on the exaltation of individualism and middle class white
concerns, and slights the significance of civic morality, group identity, and
the perspective of subordinated people.50 Some of these arguments are engaging, but they have not been sufficiently tested to shift the ideological background of constitutional rulemaking. These newer arguments serve
primarily as a justification for relaxing the requirements of the fighting words
doctrine, by sapping the claims for absolute first amendment protection and
amplifying the seriousness of the harm to victims of racist insults.
In one of the more comprehensive recent critiques of the first amendment,
Professor Mari Matsuda argues for a broad criminalization of "racist hate
speech" directed at members of subordinated groups.5" While Professor
Matsuda eschews precise definition of hate speech, offering several potentially conflicting descriptions, she does discuss several hypothetical cases that
give more shape to her concept.52 Still, the limits of her criminalization proposal are far from obvious. She justifies denial of protection to racist speech
both because of harm to victims and because "[r]acial supremacy is one of
48. Id. at 693-94.
49. See S. SCHIFFREN, THE FiRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY AND ROMANCE 78-79, 204-08
(1990) (grounding the first amendment's cherishing of dissent in the celebration by Emerson and
Whitman of "the nonconformist, the iconoclast, the dissenter").
50. See K. MACKINNON, TOWARDS A FEMINiST THEORY OF THE STATE 204-05 (1989) (arguing that assumptions underlying the first amendment "do not apply to the situation of women");
Matsuda, supra note 2, at 2322 ("The places where the law does not go to redress harm have tended
to be the places where women, children, people of color, and poor people live.")
51. Matsuda, supra note 2, at 2321.
52. See id. at 2361-74.
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the ideas we have collectively and internationally considered and rejected. '53
Thus, under Professor Matsuda's approach, it would appear that advocacy of
racial supremacy in any context could be prosecuted because of a collective
judgment that such views are meritless and harmful. This is a refreshingly
frank defense of viewpoint discrimination. Yet Professor Matsuda later reluctantly suggests that the first amendment should protect a social scientist
arguing for racial inequality so long as his presentation "is free of any
message of hatred and persecution."' 54 Focusing exclusively on the reaction
of potentially offended groups, as she urges, 5 exacerbates the difficulty in
distinguishing protected from criminal speech because a group may be offended equally by speech that nongroup members rate as either scurrilous or
insightful.
Professor Matsuda also argues that only hate speech directed at members
of subjugated groups by members of dominant groups forfeits first amendment protection. 56 Thus, while epithets directed at blacks, for example,
would be actionable, those directed at whites would not. Although the vulnerability of historically disadvantaged groups has brought racial insults to a
new prominence, it seems wrong both pragmatically and in principle to condition first amendment protection or the political positions of the speaker's
and target's ethnic groups. Professor Matsuda acknowledges that the linedrawing becomes harder if the hateful speech is directed at the white target's
57
gender, sexual preference, religious affiliation, age, poverty, or handicap.
Further confusion exists because Professor Matsuda concedes that a group's
status as subjugated can change position over time and in different localities. 58 She professes herself unconcerned by the sheer difficulty of such determinations, dismissing concerns with the observation: "The larger question is
how anyone knows anything in life or in law. To conceptualize a condition
called subordination is a legitimate alternative to denying that such a condition exists." 59 But surely one can acknowledge the reality of social inequality
without accepting a legal procedure, backed by the powerful apparatus of
criminal prosecution, which determines whether an offended individual belongs to a relevant group that suffers subordination in a certain place and
time. Are black males "subordinate" today in Washington, D.C.? How
should a court factor the respective views of Asians, women, or Boston black
53. Id. at 2360.
54. Id. at 2365.
55. Id. at 2373.
56. Id. at 2361 ("Expressions of hatred, revulsion, and anger directed against historically dominant-group members by subordinated-group members are not criminalized by the definition of racist hate messages used here.").
57. Id. at 2362.
58. Id. at 2362-63.
59. Id. at 2362.
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males on this question? Can it be doubted that trials over these issues, the
outcome of which will determine whether a member of one of these groups
will suffer a criminal penalty, would exacerbate tensions among members of
these groups?
Such inquiries into relative subjugation would not only be supremely difficult, but they would also be unable to achieve political or constitutional legitimacy. If, as Professor Matsuda urges, legal approaches to hate speech
should turn on the experience of the victims qua victims, it is difficult to see
how the outcomes can appear to be justified to non-victims. Generally, constitutional rules are justified by reference to some shared (if also disputed)
public value, such as equality or the dignity of individuals. Advocates of the
prohibition of hate speech would forfeit much to rely on the feeling of historical injustice. Most groups in American society nurse grievances for past
wrongs. All racial and ethnic insults imply debasement of the individual
through the invocation of the stereotypical vices of his or her group. To
elevate some of these insults into constitutional standards but leave others
beyond the reach of law denies our common humanity.
These comments suggest a strength of the Court's broad view of first
amendment protection for offensive speech that frontal assaults have failed to
touch: because democratic government is incompetent to proscribe certain
forms of speech, the Court will deny it the power to do so even in cases in
which a substantial majority agrees that a form of speech is worthless and
harmful. Thus, even if one were happy with a democratic determination to
punish racist insults because "[r]acial supremacy is one of the ideas we have
...considered and rejected," 6 one might worry about which other ideas the
controlling majority might consider to have been so decisively rejected that
utterance of them could lead to prosecution. Our political life stands upon
61
very few moral principles that offer guidance in making these choices. We
expect most political decisions to reflect the preferences of shifting majorities
in legislatures, and we employ constitutional rules as an imperfect mechanism of preserving liberties that embody consensual moral principles. Before
a constitutional liberty is released to permit regulation of a perceived social
60. Matsuda, supra note 2, at 2360.
61. In an article published just as this article was going to press, Professor Charles Lawrence
justifies broad prohibitions on racist speech through a novel interpretation of Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The argument is elaborate and a full commentary should await
mature reflection. Professor Lawrence's argument collapses both the distinctions between speech
and conduct and between government and private action. Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go:
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431. It does seem fair to argue that the first
amendment without something very similar to these discarded distinctions is absurd, that he offers
inadequate bases to distinguish racial statements from mockeries of marriage or of property rights,
and that he has merely transferred the field of dispute from the open ground of the special status of
racial justice in American politics to the dense thicket of interpretative methodology, much to his
disadvantage.
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wrong, a convincing argument that fighting the wrong advances a moral
principle rather than a political agenda is required. Our reluctance to limit
constitutional liberties reflects our doubts about the capacity of legislatures
to identify and apply moral principles. Proposing legal protection for some
but not all victims of racial insults exacerbates anxiety about whether such
protection rests on a political agenda. Simply arguing that civic virtue ought
to play a larger role in the decisionmaking of representative assemblies will
not make it so without profound changes in our political institutions and
culture. The distrust of democratic capacity to censor speech must be overcome before general restrictions on racist insults can be found constitutional.
The rules for punishing racist insults that universities have recently
adopted reflect prevailing views about the constitutional authority of universities in this area. Current statutes seek to punish a narrow range of utterances, cautioned, no doubt, by the recent federal district court decision in
Doe v. University of Michigan.62 In 1988 the University of Michigan adopted
a Policy on Discrimination and Discriminatory Harassment of Students in
the University Environment, which prohibited "behavior, verbal or physical,
that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on the basis of race, ethnicity,
religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age, marital
status, handicap or Vietnam-era veteran status," and poses some kind of
"threat" or "interfer[es]" with a person's university endeavors. 63 An interpretive guide, prepared by the University's Office of Affirmative Action,
listed activities and statements apparently violative of the policy, including,
"A male student makes remarks in class like 'Women just aren't as good in
this field as men.' "64
The policy was challenged in Doe as vague and overbroad by a psychology
graduate student who was concerned that he might be sanctioned for classroom discussion of "controversial theories positing biologically-based differences between sexes and races. 65 The court held the policy to be
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague; it suggested, however, that a more
66
narrowly drawn regulation might be upheld.
The University of Michigan appeared to have no coherent view of the nature or limits of its authority to regulate racial insults. For example, the
University charged a graduate student with violating the policy for stating in
a research class in the School of Social Work that he believed homosexuality
to be a treatable disease. 67 The court strongly implied that it viewed the
62. 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).

63. Id. at 856.
64. Id. at 858.
65. Id. at 858, 860.
66. Id. at 866, 867.
67. Id. at 865. A divided hearing panel refused to convict him because of its concern about
academic freedom. Id.
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policy as a hasty response to external and internal pressures to combat a
68 The policy's
perceived escalation in racial harassment on the campus.
drafters obviously had in mind cases holding that verbal harassment by coworkers of racial minorities or women could amount to violations of Title
VII's ban on employment discrimination by the employer who failed to
check the harassment.6 9 By restricting application of the policy to areas of
the campus where students had to be present to pursue their studies, the
drafters also sought to avail themselves of the suggestion in Cohen v. California and elsewhere that a "captive audience" can be protected from offensive
speech. 70 But the University of Michigan seems not to have a clear conception of its role as educator, both to maintain the civility necessary for education and to foster intellectual dispute; thus, the policy startlingly fails to
delineate sanctionable from protected speech. The court's conclusion, therefore, seems essentially correct: "the University had no idea what the limits of
the Policy were and it was essentially making up the rules as it went
along."'71 I think, however, that the federal courts should bear some of the
blame for the universities' lack of clarity about its purpose and objectives in
72
this area.
Both the University of Wisconsin and Stanford University have adopted
policies that proscribe only insults which fairly can be brought within the
ambit of "fighting words." Under its policy, Wisconsin will discipline a student who intentionally demeans a specific individual on the basis of his or her
race (or other enumerated grounds) and thereby damages the educational
environment. 73 The requirement that the insult be directed at a specific indi68. Id. at 854-56.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988); see Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). Oddly
enough, I have been unable to find any Title VII case in which there was a first amendment defense
to a claim of verbal harassment. Thus far, no university has been found in violation of Title VI, 42
U.S.C. § 2000d (1988), or Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982), for toleration of an abusive atmosphere, but anxiety about such a claim is a persistent theme in both the regulations and the justifications for their enactment. Cf Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 895-97 (1st Cir.
1988) (recognizing cause of action under Title IX for a surgical resident at a medical school hospital
who was both an employee and a student and who claimed that the hostile environment caused by
frequent unwelcome sexist comments and pictures impaired her ability to succeed in the program).
70. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 856; see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
71. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 868.
72. See infra Part IV.
73. The University of Wisconsin rule prohibits:
[R]acist or discriminatory comments, epithets or other expressive behavior directed at an
individual or on separate occasions at different individuals, or for physical conduct, if such
comments, epithets, or other expressive behavior or physical conduct intentionally:
1. Demean the race, sex, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual orientation, national origin, ancestry or age of the individual or individuals; and
2. Create an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment for education, university related work, or other university-authorized activity.
Wis. ADMIN. CODE § UWS 17.06(2) (Aug. 1989).
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vidual was included only because the drafters believed it necessary to limit
disciplinary action to fighting words in order to protect the constitutionality
of the regulation. 74 Ironically, the ordinance does not prohibit some of the
expressions of racism, such as fraternities' use of racist stereotyping, which
75
stimulated the effort to prohibit racist insults in the first place.
Stanford University's policy prohibits speech that amounts to "discriminatory harassment. ' 76 Stanford's rule explicitly limits its reach to "'fighting'
words or non-verbal symbols" directed at specific individuals and intended to
stigmatize them on the basis of their race or other minority status. 77 The
Stanford rule does not reach diffuse or broadcast vilification any more than
74. Hodulik, ProhibitingDiscriminatoryHarassmentby Regulating Student Speech: A Balancing
of First-Amendment and University Interests, 16 J.C. & UNIV. L. 573, 587 (1990). Ms. Hodulik, a
staff lawyer for the University of Wisconsin, explains that several of the perplexing aspects of the
rule reflect attempts to trace constitutional boundaries. Thus, the intent requirement reflects the
drafters' view that Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), requires that anyone punishing
speech must show that the speaker intended to bring about the bad effects that the law seeks to
prevent. Although the analogy of a speaker attempting to persuade a crowd to storm the legislature
to a student insulting a classmate seems somewhat strained, Wisconsin apparently felt constrained
to afford constitutional protection to those who are merely tasteless and insensitive.
The rule also requires a finding that the particular insult "creates an intimidating, hostile, or
demeaning environment for education." Wis. ADMIN. CODE § UWS 17.06(2)(a)(2) (Aug. 1989).
Wisconsin here seeks to track the requirements for making out a case of employment discrimination
for unchecked verbal harassment under Title VII on the sensible assumption that such abuse will
not be held protected by the first amendment. But must a university make a finding in each case
that a particular slur creates a hostile educational environment in order to discipline the speaker?
One wonders what evidence might be adduced to establish this quite complicated issue of mixed law
and fact and dreads the complexity, expense, and legalization that such an inquiry must add to the
disciplinary process. Surely a university has the right to maintain as a normative matter that racial
insults always damage the educational environment. A university should have the power to discipline on occasions when its failure to do so would not amount to a violation of Title VI.
75. Hodulik, supra note 74, at 587.
76. Bartholomew, Anti-Harassment Measures Approved, Stanford University Campus Report,
May 30, 1990, at 1, col. 1. The rule is an interpretation of Stanford's "Fundamental Standard,"
which requires students to "respect... the rights of others as is demanded of good citizens." Id. at
17. The interpretation provides in pertinent part:
Speech or other expression constitutes harassment by personal vilification if it:
a) is intended to insult or stigmatize an individual or a small number of individuals on
the basis of their sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or national and
ethnic origin; and
b) is addressed directly to the individual or individuals whom it insults or stigmatizes;
and
c) makes use of insulting or "fighting" words or non-verbal symbols.
In the context of discriminatory harassment by personal vilification, insulting or "fighting" words or non-verbal symbols are those "which by their very utterance inflict injury
or tend to incite to an immediate breach of the peace," and which are commonly understood to convey direct and visceral hatred or contempt for human beings on the basis of
their sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or national and ethnic origin.
Id
77. Grey, supra note 30, at 51.
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does the Wisconsin policy. Professor Thomas Grey, who drafted the elegant
Stanford rule with an eye to providing a model for other universities, justifies
the narrow scope of the rule on his sensible judgment that:
any broader approach, for example one that proceeds on the basis of a
theory of group defamation, or (like the University of Michigan regulation
recently struck down by a federal court) on the basis of the tendency of
speech to create a hostile environment, without restriction to "fighting
words" (or some equivalent such as "intentional infliction of serious emotional distress"), will be found by courts applying current case law to be
78
invalid.
Like many private universities, Stanford has voluntarily sought to conform
its regulation of speech to the first amendment rules applicable to state universities. Therefore, at least for heuristic purposes, it seems appropriate to
treat Stanford's regulation as subject to first amendment challenge.
Both the Wisconsin and Stanford regulations seek to prohibit insults akin
to fighting words while avoiding any broad challenge to established constitutional ideas about a public institution's authority to proscribe certain forms
of speech as worthless or pernicious. The carefully tailored scope of these
regulations is understandable given the probable continuation of the courts'
persistent doubts about the capacity of the political process to make good
faith judgments about the content of speech based on defensible principles.
Despite the narrow scope of these policies, universities do believe that racial
insults are a meritless form of speech that poisons the atmosphere on campus
for learning and discussion. The narrow prohibitions enacted to regulate
such speech, however, fail to reach some of the most prominent forms of
racial insult in the university, such as those broadcast in student publications, on posters, and during social events. A fresh consideration of the role
of the university in maintaining an intellectually healthy environment is
therefore in order.
III.

UNIVERSITY SPEECH VALUES AND RACIAL INSULTS

My conclusion in the previous section that group vilification cannot be
outlawed throughout society does not foreclose the question of whether universities may exert such power over their own members. This question seems
never to be considered separately from the question of the power of government over the people generally. Indeed, many writers who oppose governmental restrictions on speech argue that a university should have even less
authority to restrict speech because it is devoted to free speech-it is "peculiarly" the marketplace of ideas.7 9 This view draws strength from a conven78. Id. at 54.
79. See, e.g., Gunther, Good Speech, Bad Speech, 24 STAN. LAW., Spring 1990, at 4, 7 ("Univer-
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tional reading of several judicial opinions.8° Furthermore, even those who
favor restrictions on offensive speech tend to view the university simply as a
microcosm of the political world.8 1
Both of these views are misleadingly incomplete. The university should
properly be seen as a distinct social entity, whose commitment to enhancing
the quality of speech justifies setting minimum standards for the manner of
speech among its members. 82 This distinction exists in tension with the constitutional or political principle that accords students first amendment rights
of freedom of expression against state universities. The difficulty comes in
articulating the bases for these ideas adequately to permit the law to draw an
appropriate boundary between the educational authority of the school and
the political freedom of the student. For a variety of reasons, courts have
performed this function inadequately, so that most lawyers now seem to accept the premise that a student's racial vilification of another must be examined as a component of the student's political rights. It seems to me that
this phrasing of the question leaves out the indispensable values of academic
life.
In Part II, I reluctantly concluded that the state should not be allowed to
prohibit racial insults, not because they have any merit as speech, but because of the general concern that the state should not act as a censor of
expression it concludes to be worthless or pernicious.8 3 Government does
not possess either the ability or the principled criteria necessary to distinguish between speech that is under attack merely because it is resented by the
majority and that which is objectively worthless. In the context of governmental regulation, the broad interpretation of the first amendment is seen
primarily as a defense of the individual against the heterogeneity and mediocrity of society at large.
The university's relationship to the speech of its members is fundamentally
different from the state's. The university has a corporate reverence for
84
speech as the embodiment of, and stimulus to, thinking and knowledge.
Implicit in the university's core function is the regulation of expression to
enhance its quality. Membership in the academic community is restricted to
sity campuses should exhibit greater, not less, freedom of expression than prevails in society at
large."); Strossen, Regulating-Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484,
502-03; infra text accompanying notes 139-41 & 154-55; see also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (holding unconstitutional New York teacher loyalty regulations that applied
sanctions based on membership in an organization without a showing of specific intent to further
illegal aims of the organization).
80. See infra text accompanying notes 134-64.
81. Matsuda, supra note 2, at 2370-73.
82. Byrne, supra note 5, at 334-35.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 10-15.
84. The arguments within this paragraph are expressed in greater detail in Byrne, supra note 5, at
258-61.
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those who possess the talent and training to teach or learn at a high level.
The academic speech of the teachers and the students is subject to disciplinary norms deemed to facilitate criticism and discourse; those who do not
meet the standards of speech set by the university are subject to penaltiesstudents through grades and faculty through the denial of promotion or tenure. These restrictions exist because academics traditionally believe that the
ends of scholarship and teaching are advanced by adherence to collective
criteria. Thus, the fact that universities function through speech and the criticism of ideas does not mean that speech ought to be under less restriction
there than in society as a whole; on the contrary, both scholarship and learning necessarily involve the discipline of speech to improve it.85
Confusion about the nature of free speech in universities stems in part
from a tradition of viewing the university, the corporate entity distinct from
students, faculty, and administrators, as properly neutral about the speech of
its members.8 6 This view of the university played a large role in the argu87
ments advanced for academic freedom by professors earlier in this century.
These pioneers sought to protect themselves from Christian or capitalist biases held by trustees and administrators that could constrain the development of scientific or objective knowledge; accordingly, they sought to devolve
evaluation of the acceptability of a professor's views or methods from lay
trustees to academically recognized experts in the speaker's field. 8 8 While
the different facets of the academic community may have concerns about
who speaks for the university or what political coloration the institution
adopts, never has it been accepted that the university should be indifferent
about the value of teaching and learning. The university's commitment to
teaching and learning of a certain kind represents ideological attachments
from which no member of the academic community ought to back away.
These commitments give focus and value to the academic enterprise.
The university as speech monitor thus is quite different from the state.
The university pursues normative goals of speech, such as clarity, rigor, re85. Analogously, Professor Robert Post has distinguished "public discourse," which is insulated
by the first amendment from "the enforcement of community norms," from speech within "community" and governmental subgroups that properly regulate speech either to achieve public goods or to
preserve "civility and dignity." Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous
Opinion, DemocraticDeliberation,and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 667,
684-85 (1990). The university is properly characterized as both an autochthonous community and
an instrumental agent. The university generates juridical norms for its members based upon its
commitments to ways of making sense of experience; decisions by central legal authorities to displace these norms should be taken only with a sense of grave responsibility. Cf Cover, Forward:
Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1983) (courts eliminate legal norms created by "jurisgenerative" communities to maintain the interpretative order necessary for social order).
86. Byrne, supra note 5, at 273-79.
87. Id.

88. Id.
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sponsiveness, and balance, whereas the state must be neutral about both the
ends and the means of speech. When the university proscribes a manner of
speech, it is more likely that the step is taken to further valid goals of education or scholarship rather than to maintain favor with the majority who may
dismiss the censor.8 9 The role of the university as speech monitor seems
tolerably well established within the domains of curricular instruction and
scholarship. The academic justification for university regulation of speech
beyond the curriculum has been insufficiently studied.
Universities can justify restraints on student's extracurricular activities
when they substantially interfere with academic values and no independent
student value, such as the political rights of students as citizens, outweighs
the academic value in the circumstances. 90 Obviously, many student activities can be prohibited because they plausibly can be considered harmful to
the educational experience. For example, the Supreme Court long ago held
that the fourteenth amendment offers no hindrance to a state university's
prohibiting students from belonging to a fraternity; 9' recently the Court
turned back a student's first amendment challenge to a university prohibition
of commercial solicitation in dormitories. 92 In contrast, the Court has upheld students' first amendment rights against universities when the students'
extracurricular expression touched more closely on their political rights as
citizens and the universities failed to articulate valid interests in prohibiting
the speech. 93 This approach directs us to consider carefully the effects of
racial insults on the university's academic values and goals in order to balance these effects against the students' rights to free speech.
The university has three moral commitments that shape its activities:
these are to the values of truth, humanism, and democracy. 94 Consideration
89. Id.
90. See id. at 263.
91. Waugh v. Board of Trustees, 237 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1914).
92. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028 (1989). Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in
Fox supports this analysis rather more explicitly than does the Court's opinion. Blackmun phrases
the student's right in helpful terms: "[A] student surely has the right to use this residence [le.
dormitory room] for expressive activities that are not inconsistent with the educational mission of
the university or with the needs of other students." Id. at 3039 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also
American Future Sys. v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 752 F.2d 854, 865-67 (3d Cir. 1984) (university
regulation prohibiting group sales demonstrations in dormitory rooms upheld because it supported
university's interest as property owner and educator and was not excessive), cert. denied sub norm
Johnson v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 473 U.S. 911 (1985); id. at 867, 870 (Adams, J., concurring)
(court ruling requiring state university to permit commercial solicitation in dormitories would demean institutional academic freedom).
93. See Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 670-71 (1973) (per curiam); Healy v. James,
408 U.S. 169, 194 (1972); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 508-09 (1969). These cases are discussed in detail infra text accompanying notes 134-75.
94. I have previously characterized modern American higher education as having three primary
values that exist in uneasy conjunction with each other. See Byrne, supra note 5, at 278-83. This
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of the educational mission of the modem university under the headings of
these three commitments can help clarify the grounds upon which the Constitution can countenance distinct treatment of the university. The commitment to truth is manifested in research, scholarship, and the invaluable
system of professorial academic freedom. The commitment to humanism
can be seen in the conveyance to students of usable traditions of culture and
values and the related attempt to develop within the student a capacity for
informed and independent judgment. The commitments to truth and humanism together shape the idea of liberal education and justify a constitutional academic freedom protecting the university from political interference
by the state. The commitment to democracy can be seen in the university's
provision of useful education and applied research that benefit society directly by increasing social mobility and national wealth. I will elaborate on
each commitment briefly and examine whether they might justify disciplinary action against a member who insults a member of another racial group.
The university's first commitment is to truth. As argued above, the university does not manifest this commitment to truth by licensing all expression. Rather, truth is equated with knowledge, precepts, or hypotheses
tentatively established through painstaking, expert, and disinterested inquiry. 95 Students come to the university to learn disciplines of thought,
whether in the sciences or the humanities, that are more likely to solve
problems or contribute to constructive discourse than the more subjective,
flabbier, and less coherent thinking to which they were limited upon matriculation. The commitment to forms of thought and expression conducive to
truth and coherence lies at the core of academic values; without this commitment, the university is a scam.
Racial insults have no status among discourse committed to truth. They
do not attempt to establish, improve, or criticize any proposition or object of
inquiry. They do not even have enough truth value to be false, to represent a
discarded alternative idea. Racial insults communicate only scorn or hatred
irrationally based on immutable characteristics of the target. Their goal can
only be to diminish the victim or to accentuate the belonging of the speaker
to a group outside of the despised circle. They may relieve emotional tension
within the speaker, but only at the greater cost of increasing tension within
and among the audience.
Thus, the university's commitment to truth provides a basis for proscribheuristic trinity is adapted from L. VEYSEY, THE EMERGENCE OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 1213 (1965).
95. It does not seem necessary to consider here the philosophical bases of academic criteria for
"knowledge" or "truth." No doubt they are largely conventional and posit a relation to reality that
cannot be proven. But in the practical process of weighing rules for academic discourse, the law
ought not cast down the evolving structures of conventional disciplinary norms simply because they
fail to satisfy the yearning of epistemology for a philosophically satisfactory account of knowledge.
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ing racial insults. The university justifiably could conclude that racial insults
neither contribute to the pursuit of truth nor shed light on any issue of value.
Rather, racial insults hamper the search for truth by breeding tribal commitments and animosities that constrain rational discussion and by fostering tensions that cloud clear-eyed perception and discredit judicious reflection. For
example, racial insults may contribute to an atmosphere that causes scholars
or students in the target group either to censor themselves in academic analysis or exposition or to pursue blindly the goals of their group without regard
to the long-term interests of the entire academic community.
Humanism is a second core value of the university. The university is committed to the intellectual development of its students. The students attend to
acquire knowledge and gain intellectual skills. Influences that interfere with
this goal may be prohibited. Thus, just as universities have been allowed to
exclude commercial solicitation from dormitories 96 and require that demonstrations be held beyond earshot of the library, 97 they could also require students to wear shirts in class and exclude television sets from dormitories. In
each case, preventing distraction of the student from the acknowledged work
of the school permits limitation on a form of expression guaranteed to individuals in the wider world.
Racial slurs more profoundly burden the striving toward educational attainments of their victims than do noise or inane sales patter. Minority
scholars have been eloquent in expressing the disabling effects racial insults
work on minority students and faculty. 98 These harms are exacerbated by
the social position of minorities at most American universities where until
recently they studied only in small numbers. Racial insults obviously burden
the ability of targets to pursue their studies; infuriated and embarrassed, their
emotions may push them toward self-protection or retaliation. The university should have an obligation to protect its students from such disabling
harassment. If an employer failed to take corrective action when an employee was racially insulted or sexually harassed, the employee would have
an action against the employer under Title VII for fostering a hostile work
environment; 99 it seems that only a lack of imagination on the part of the bar
has precluded analogous actions against universities under Title VI.' °°
Humanist values support the prohibition of racial insults even apart from
the need to protect minority students in their pursuit of education. Ethnic
and national diversity among students and faculty contribute to the cosmo96. Fox, 109 S. Ct. at 3038.
97. Shamloo v. Mississippi State Bd. of Trustees of Institutions of Higher Learning, 630 F.2d
516, 523-24 (5th Cir. 1980).
98. See supra note 9.
99. See supra note 69.
100. Title VI prohibits discrimination in federally assisted programs on the basis of race. 42

U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
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politan culture of learning that has always reached beyond physical and tribal boundaries in search of merit and knowledge. During its formative years
in the Middle Ages, the university recruited faculty and students from great
distances; indeed, the medieval term most used for the university, the
studium generale, emphasized that faculty and students came to study there
from all the nations of Europe.101 The introduction of students to the international culture of the university has never been a more necessary part of
education than today, when economic, environmental, and political challenges force the peoples of the world into greater contact and cooperation
regardless of their prejudices. Racial insults are serious solecisms within the
cosmopolitan culture of higher education, and a university has failed if it has
not conveyed to its students that racial insults are as unacceptable as the
mental sloth and provincial ignorance they exemplify.
Serious arguments might be brought against the view I have taken of a
university's authority to prohibit racist slurs. One argument is that this regime will inevitably hinder worthwhile free speech by casting a pall of "liberal" orthodoxy on controversial issues on campus. 10 2 Thus, good faith
arguments about, for example, the justice of affirmative action or the value of
patriarchal language in the Bible will be banned. Certainly the university
cannot, consistent with its primary commitment to truth, ban substantive
views because of their repugnance to any political orthodoxy. Views stated
in a form that permits rational response should be answered by that means,
for rational argument always has a privileged place in the university.
This conclusion is contested by some. The University of Michigan, for
example, charged a graduate student with violating its antiharassment regulation when he suggested in class that homosexuality was a disease that could
be cured through counseling;10 3 Professor Matsuda would hold all expressions of racial supremacy to a higher standard of prima facie acceptability
before allowing them to be voiced in the university. °4 Neither of these views
101. See, e.g., 1 H.

RASHDALL, THE UNIVERSITIES OF EUROPE IN THE MIDDLE AGES

7 (F.

Powicke & A. Emden eds. 1936); Ferrullo, Parisius-Paradisus:The City, Its Schools, and the Origins of the University of Paris, in THE UNIVERSITY AND THE CITY: FROM MEDIEVAL ORIGINS TO
THE PRESENT

24-25 (T. Bender ed. 1988).

102. See Dembart, At Stanford, Leftists Become Censors, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1989, at A35, col.
2; Finn, supra note 11, at 18.
The scare quotes around the dreaded "L" word appear prudent. Because higher education comports with a vast range of political ideologies short of totalitarian regimes and anarchy, it has been
fostered by kings and popes as well as by burghers and bureaucrats. Thus, enshrining one current
political perspective would be wrong. The university does, however, hold fast to a "liberal" creed if
one uses the term in its educational meaning (as in "liberal" education) to free or liberate the mind
from ignorance and prejudice through training and knowledge. This commitment is not value neutral, even if politically indeterminate, but the university's authority to act upon it is vouchsafed by
constitutional academic freedom.
103. Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 865 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
104. Matsuda, supra note 2, at 2356-61.
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seeks to sweep away all racially offensive ideas, but they do cross the line
from regulating manners of expression to prohibiting substantive ideas capable of refutation. Focusing on the university's commitment to both truth and
humanism makes it easier to perceive the difference between the use of racial
insults, which the university may ban to facilitate the discussion of ideas, and
ideas themselves, however preposterous or offensive, which should instead be
dispatched through the usual medium of university discourse.
For the university to bar offensive ideas would give precedence to a commitment beyond those to truth and to learning, a commitment to racial justice as a primary goal. Pursuit of such a social goal may appropriately be
embraced under the university's third commitment-to democracy. Indeed,
most universities openly pursue equal opportunity and diversity as important
goals. This democratic commitment encompasses the many important ways
that the university directly serves society, such as by training students for
useful employments or by conducting applied research to solve contemporary technical or economic problems. Among their contributions to democracy, universities have aided the integration of, first, European immigrants
and, now, non-European Americans into a shared culture and economy by
facilitating their admission to the university and altering the curriculum or
social context to meet their special needs. 10 5 Given that most universities are
already committed to democracy, what is objectionable about banning racially offensive speech to further that goal?
There are at least two answers to this question. First, as a normative matter, the university's commitment to democracy ought to be subordinate to its
commitments to truth and learning. When these commitments conflict, the
democratic commitment should be put aside because it is not indispensable
to the identity of the university. When a university relaxes its commitment
to democracy, it simply becomes less useful for social purposes and less popular; when it relaxes its commitments to truth and to humanism, it loses its
soul. For the university to proscribe an idea that is capable of refutation
belittles the efficacy of rational deliberation, the principle upon which higher
10 6
education is built.
105. As examples, state universities, Catholic universities, and black universities historically have
devoted themselves to advancing the social and economic interest of, respectively, working people,
Catholic ethnic minorities, and blacks.
106. It may be appropriate, however, for a university to penalize students or professors for
promulgating racist views when they do so dishonestly or in bad faith. See Mooney, N.Y. City
College Panel to Weigh Academic Freedom, Inflammatory Racial Views of Two Faculty Members,
CHRONICLE HIGHER EDUc., May 23, 1990, at A13 (panel to investigate two faculty members, one
black and one white, who espouse racially inflammatory views). Formally rational statements that
propound hurtful racist views may be based on knowingly false grounds or concocted with culpable
incompetence. Such statements damage the exchange of intellectual views in a manner comparable
to plagiarism or scientific fraud while fanning racial passions. Of course, all universities should take
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Second, when the university embraces democratic commitments, such as
when it acts to promote racial justice, it thrusts itself into the affairs of society at large and therefore makes itself fully subject to regulation by civil authority. For example, when a university offers for sale television rights for
football games, it becomes fully subject to the restrictions of the antitrust
laws; but when it adheres to agreements concerning accreditation standards,
a core educational concern, it is not.107 Should a university prohibit the rational expression of ideas of racial supremacy to further the goal of racial
justice, its powers would be fully limited by the speaker's general first amendment rights of free expression. The university has no more competence to
limit speech in support of social goals than does the state. It cannot be
trusted as a censor for these purposes any more than can state bureaucrats,
because it has no more access to transcendent or consensual standards for
finally determining the social good.' 0 In positing democratic goals, the dean
is as subject to political influence as the commissioner. Thus if, as I have
assumed for purposes of this article, general legal prohibitions on racial insults are unconstitutional, state university prohibitions on the advocacy of
racial supremacy must also be unconstitutional.
Some readers will have undoubtedly lost patience by now with my claims
for the virtue of the university and will complain that I have drawn too ideal
a portrait of what are in fact diverse institutions imperfectly pursuing more
tangible goals, such as wealth and prestige, through attempts to please identifiable interest groups. These concerns merit some practical limitation on university authority, described in the next paragraph, but they ought not deprive
all universities of powers necessary to pursue their educational goals. If one
concedes that a university is a distinct legal institution, one should give precedence in analysis to those characteristics of the university that distinguish
it from other institutions. The law of academic freedom protects the autonomy and characteristic structures of the university because of the constitutional significance of the university's central commitments to truth and
care to protect the academic freedom of professors who offer painful views by carefully inquiring
into the offender's honesty and not imposing ad hoc criteria for competence.
107. Compare NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 114-15 (1984) (NCAA television plan
for college football games violates the Sherman Act) with Marjorie Webster Junior College v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools, 432 F.2d 650, 653-57 (D.C. Cir.) (Sherman Act
inapplicable to college accreditation association's refusal to accredit, on educational grounds, forprofit schools), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
108. The distinction I draw is quite consonant with that drawn by Justice Powell in his controlling opinion in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
In Bakke, Justice Powell denied that a university could constitutionally justify race-conscious admissions policies on the basis of its desire to remedy general societal racial discrimination, but could
justify such policies on the basis that its educational goals included the selection of a diverse student
body to promote a "robust exchange of ideas," an educational judgment itself protected by the
university's constitutional right to academic freedom. Id. at 309-15. See Byrne, supra note 5, at
313-15.
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humanism. 0 9 Legal principles support these commitments because they are
goods that society urgently needs, is unable to engineer at will, and seeks to
preserve at institutions where they have flourished, if somewhat imperfectly,
for a very long time.
The law should deny powers based on these educational commitments to
institutions that flout them. Courts should not protect the constitutional autonomy of institutions that purport to be universities but fail to nourish internally the tradition of academic freedom.110 By the same reasoning, courts
should not accommodate an exceptional regulation of student speech by institutions that fail to manifest their commitments to truth and humanism by
adhering to principles of academic freedom. Even a true university can justify regulating the speech of its members to a greater extent than the state
only when it can show that it seeks in good faith to advance academic
values. I I
This conclusion returns us to the theoretical question that broods over the
foregoing discussion: what justifies the university's prohibiting speech that
the state itself cannot? So far I have argued only on the basis of principle
that the university has valid reasons that will instinctively be conceded for
restricting some forms of speech, that restrictions which enhance the search
for truth or contribute to the cultivation of students or faculty enrich rather
than diminish speech, and that the university is likely to adopt restrictions on
speech appropriate to these ends. Even if one accepts this argument as plausible, however, one can still question whether it provides the university with
any legal basis for restricting speech that the state itself cannot.
I believe that there are two strong legal bases for such restrictions by the
university. First, the university is not the state. Constitutional limitations
apply only to the state and its instrumentalities and surrogates. Inquiries
concerning which instrumentalities and surrogates will be subject to constitutional limitation is the domain of the state action doctrine. Elsewhere I have
lamented the senseless rigidity and overbreadth of the state action doctrine as
applied to state universities. 1 2 As to universities, a flat rule has developed:
state universities are state actors, private universities are not. 1 3 Although
109. Byrne, supra note 5, at 315 n.253.
110. Id. at 338.
111. This standard builds on the well-established constitutional rule that a student at a state
university can challenge dismissal for academic failure only when she can show that the decision
was not based in good faith on academic grounds. See Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474
U.S. 214, 227-28 (1985) (finding no violation of due process in the dismissal of a student when
record demonstrates that the decision was conscientious and careful); Board of Curators v.
Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 88 (1978) (holding that dismissed medical student was afforded full procedural due process by the school, because dismissal was for academic, not disciplinary, reasons and
the "school is an academic institution, not a courtroom or administrative hearing room").
112. See Byrne, supra note 5, at 299-300.
113. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 839-43 (1982) (private school's receipt of sub-
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virtually all universities have some fiscal involvement with the state, the degree of involvement varies greatly. Nonetheless, similarities among universities are more significant than their differences; many private universities
receive massive amounts of public money and carry out numerous governmental educational and research projects; most state universities exercise
substantial practical autonomy (and some enjoy significant legal autonomy)
from their states. Although private universities are under no compulsion to
follow first amendment free speech principles, many do so voluntarily in situations in which there is no conflict with educational needs.
Despite the rigidities of current doctrine, a state university ought not be
considered a state actor when it enacts restrictions on speech necessary to its
educational purpose and its commitments to truth and humanism. For example, a university can dismiss an untenured professor because it believes his
manner of speaking to be confused or banal, an authority denied the state
itself. 114 If one accepts that a university can ban racial insults because they
hamper the search for truth or the development of students, the same ends
for which untenured professors are sacked, then one should agree that the
university should not be treated as a state actor when it adopts such
5

restrictions. " 1

The second legal basis for the university's regulation of speech is that, to
the extent such restrictions further its commitments to truth and humanism,
16
Elsewhere I have
they are protected by constitutional academic freedom."
amendment to
first
the
under
discussed the scope of the university's right
7
foster academic speech. 1 Suffice it to say here that when the university acts
to safeguard liberal education, which is understood both as the disinterested
pursuit of truth according to disciplinary criteria and the elaboration and
instruction in culture, the state is powerless to interfere. If one accepts that
the prohibition of racial insults furthers these liberal values, the decision to
adopt the prohibition of speech itself stands on the high ground of the first
amendment.
A reader might be forgiven if she at first views as absurd an argument that
stantially all its funds from state did not make it a state actor); see also Krohn v. Harvard Law
School, 552 F.2d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 1977) (Harvard College's acceptance of state financial assistance

and regulation by the state did not "render [Harvard's] activities governmental in nature").
114. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
115. A possible resolution of these problem might be predicated on inquiring whether the state
university is acting pursuant to its commitments to truth or humanism, in which case it is acting
according to the distinct values of a university and should not be considered a state instrumentality,
or pursuant to its commitment to democracy, in which case it properly may be considered an agent
of and subject to the same constitutional limitations as the state itself. Cf. Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (regulated monopoly may be considered state actor only when
"there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action").
116. See Byrne, supra note 5, at 314-15.
117. See id. at 311-39.
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prohibitions on certain forms of speech are themselves protected under the
first amendment. But constitutional values frequently conflict, even within
the first amendment, such as when courts must accommodate the guarantees
of religious free exercise and disestablishment. In an effort to preserve university authority protected by academic freedom, constitutional guarantees
to individuals are sometimes read narrowly. Thus, in Regents of the University of Californiav. Bakke,1 18 Justice Powell sanctioned university affirmative
action plans as protected by academic freedom, while suggesting that in a
nonacademic setting such plans would violate the fourteenth amendment and
Title VI. 119 Indeed, the most characteristic appearance of academic freedom
in constitutional cases has been as a constitutional value balanced against or
accommodated with other constitutional concerns. 20
The strongest objection to the position that I have advocated might be
described as jurisdictional. One might concede that I have appropriately described the university's role as a benevolent regulator of speech within the
scope of scholarly or educational endeavor, yet complain that I have extended its authority into a wider sphere of student autonomy where such
authority is inappropriate, and would be or has been brushed aside by the
courts. Such regulation is inappropriate, this argument goes, because university students are adults who deserve autonomy from the dictates of university
officials. The university's authority has been circumscribed by the Supreme
Court in a series of important cases guaranteeing students free speech rights
against state universities, even concerning speech to which university officials
might reasonably object.1 2 1
Responding to this objection requires a detailed consideration of the
Supreme Court's decisions establishing students' rights of free speech against
state universities. As will be seen, although these cases have protected emphatically a certain kind of student speech, they have said little about the
competing educational interests of universities. A short answer to the argument that these precedents forbid the university from regulating speech more
extensively than can the state is that the Court has never protected student
speech that interferes with valid educational objectives. Interference with
education has been the Court's touchstone for distinguishing the domain
within which the school may regulate speech for academic ends from the
domain in which student speech must be governed by general social standards. I have posited that racial insults may be prohibited because they have
no truth value, they emotionalize and trivialize discussion of race relations,
118. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
119. Id. at 312-14.
120. See Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225-26 (1985); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 278-80 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring).
121. See infra text accompanying notes 134-58.
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and they deter their targets from full membership in the academic community. Modest, narrowly-drawn prohibitions of racial insults might well be
upheld on such grounds if the university can demonstrate the reality of its
concerns and the role such prohibitions play in addressing these concerns.
This short answer to the jurisdictional objection may suffice for purposes
of litigation, but it begs the difficult and intriguing questions: What is the
permissible scope of the university's valid educational concerns? Are these
interests sufficiently weighty to permit prohibition of what, we presume, is
speech protected in society at large? As will be seen, the Court's treatment of
interference with educational objectives in the cases offers little help in considering the regulation of racial insults because the cases the Court has decided were concerned with aggressive political expression and the
maintenance of basic order in an extraordinary historical context. Isolating
and making use of the underlying principles of these cases requires cautious
consideration of their relevance to our own day.

IV.

THE SUPREME COURT'S INADEQUATE DOCTRINE
ON STUDENT SPEECH

The Supreme Court inaugurated student free speech rights under the first
amendment during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Prior to this time, stu122 While in
dents had little in the way of recognized constitutional rights.
theory university students enjoyed rights of free expression that were less
123 Thus, while
than those of adults, in practice they enjoyed greater rights.
students lived with the vestiges of the university's authority in loco parentis
until the late 1960s, 124 they also benefited from the general respect given free
thought on American campuses and the replacing of parental supervision
with the distracted and half-hearted discipline typical at universities. Then,
122. See Steir v. New York State Educ. Comm'n, 271 F.2d 13, 17-18 (2d Cir. 1959) (affirming
dismissal of student for written protest against university policies and associated violations of suspension conditions). The dissenting opinion in Steir of Chief Judge Clark, former dean of Yale Law
School, points toward the new era in student free speech rights. See id. at 22-23 (Clark, C.J.,
dissenting).
123. For an empirical study of student free speech prior to the advent of constitutional rulemaking, see generally E. WILLIAMSON & J. COWAN, THE AMERICAN STUDENT'S FREEDOM OF
ExPRESSION; A RESEARCH APPRAISAL (1966). The authors found that students at private universities and large public universities enjoyed extensive rights of expression on controversial topics,
while students at smaller public and sectarian institutions enjoyed somewhat less extensive rights.
Id. at 152-63.
124. The classic judicial expression of the college's authority in loco parentis is Gott v. Berea
College, 156 Ky. 376, 377, 161 S.W. 204, 206 (1913) (upholding a college rule designed to prevent
students from wasting their money by prohibiting them from entering public restaurants). The
court in Gott stated that, under the in loco parentisdoctrine, "[w]hether the rules or regulations are
wise, or their aims worthy, is a matter left solely to the discretion of the authorities, or parents." Id.
at 379, 161 S.W. at 206. As university faculty became professional scholars, however, they lost
interest in supervising the extracurricular activities of students. See Byrne, supra note 5, at 272.
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however, the shocks of the civil rights movement, the protest against the war
in Southeast Asia, and the cultural "revolution" of the time created new demands for student power and startling forms of student expression that burst
the seams of the old accommodations. 12 5 While frequently extolling the virtues of ordered liberty, the Supreme Court of the period decisively sided with
the students.
One cannot understand the Court's decisions on student free speech during these years without appreciating the anxiety established lawyers felt
about the "youth revolution," any more than one can understand the anticommunist cases of the 1950s without appreciating the degree of fear of communist subversion that typified the time.1 26 Between 1964 and 1968, violent
student demonstrations occurred at several leading universities, including
Berkeley, Michigan, Stanford, Wisconsin, Howard, and Columbia. After the
United States bombing of Cambodia in the spring of 1970, seemingly all universities rose in the protests that met fatal repression at Kent State and Jackson State Universities. Although liberals throughout society supported many
of the goals of the student protestors, such as ending racial discrimination
and the Southeast Asian war, most were repulsed by the tactics of the most
radical students, which included the forced occupation of buildings, strikes,
and bombings.127 Itbecame imperative for liberal leaders to demarcate persuasively the proper bounds of student protest and political activity, so that
violence and disruption could be condemned from the firmest rock of liberal
values, the first amendment. 128 Thus, one finds numerous social leaders of
125. See, e.g., THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CAMPUS UNREST 51-89

(1970); CRISIS AT COLUMBIA, REPORT OF THE FACT-FINDING COMMISSION APPOINTED TO INVESTIGATE THE DISTURBANCES AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN APRIL AND MAY 1969, at 4-18

(1969) [hereinafter Cox COMMISSION REPORT].
126. See Dennis v United States, 341 U.S. 494, 546-49 (1951) (discussing the threat of the Communist party).
127. As a college student between 1969 and 1973, I participated in numerous protests and demonstrations against national and university policies. In the spring of 1970, I volunteered to be a
student marshall for a large demonstration against ROTC. The atmosphere grew tense, the organizers of the demonstration deployed the marshals around the building that housed ROTC. The
angriest protestors then surrounded us, yelling and screaming at us to get out of the way so they
could trash the building. I remember vividly one friend of mine among the angry crowd shaking his
fist at me and calling me a "pig." After a due amount of surging and jostling, and a few broken
windows, the crowd seeped away. My friend later earned an M.B.A. and became an accountant for
a bank.
128. Thus, the Cox Commission, after making several suggestions for liberal reform at Columbia,
stressed: "Resort to violence or physical harassment or obstruction is never an acceptable tactic for
influencing decisions in a university .... [T]he survival-literally the survival--of the free university depends upon the entire community's active rejection of disruptive demonstrations." Cox
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 125, at 196-97. Similarly, Professor Charles Wright concluded
that the judicial development of a student right of free speech "shows 'that the courts... are ready
to vindicate claims for justice rooted in constitutional principle' and blunts the argument of those
who defend the use of coercive power on the ground that it is often the only effective means of
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the day simultaneously advocating full first amendment rights for students
against their universities and denouncing29violence and disruption as inimical
to the values of liberty and democracy.
In ascribing a motive of containment to proponents of the view that students enjoy full first amendment rights against universities, I do not mean to
imply either ulterior motives or foolishness. There were several powerful arguments for granting students such rights even if times had been calm. Students in the late 1960s and early 1970s were older than students of earlier
30
times-more were over thirty than under eighteen° -and the wartime military draft made eighteen seem much older than it had during peacetime.
College-aged youth seemed to have original cultural and political values that
were transforming the larger society. How could this mass avant-garde be
denied the right of free expression? Moreover, several famous student demonstrations were directed at university policies that curtailed fundamental
political speech of students. The Berkeley sit-in of 1964, the great model for
student activism, began when the university injudiciously extended a prohibition on all campus political activity to an area outside the main gate where
student activists had long distributed pamphlets and recruited adherents.131
The university administrations of the day compounded the problem by implementing outdated and -paternalistic rules, such as a complete ban on political activity on campus, inherited from an earlier day that ill-comported with
132
In such
the bureaucratic and worldly character of much university work.
bringing about institutional change." Wright, The Constitution on Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV.
1027, 1086 (1970) (quoting Tigar, Book Review, 67 MICH. L. REV. 612, 613 (1969)).
129. See REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION ON CAMPUS GOVERNMENT AND STUDENT DISSENT 5, 11-18 (1970).
130. NAT'L CENTER FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIG. OF EDUC. STATISTICS table 150, at 169

(1989).
131. See REPORT ON THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 45-46 (1965) [hereinaf-

ter BERKELEY REPORT]. See generally REVOLUTION AT BERKELEY (M. Miller & S. Gilmore eds.
1965) (contemporary accounts of events and causes of free speech protests).
132. The tension regarding student free speech rights is illustrated by the position of Clark Kerr,
then-President of the University of California, who in 1963 published the best-known defense of the
large pluralist, bureaucratic, research, and service university, THE USES OF THE UNIVERSITY

(1963). Kerr received an academic freedom award from the American Association of University
Professors in 1963 for establishing new university rules permitting communists to speak on campus.
In the spring of 1964, Kerr delivered a speech in which he emphasized his continuing support for a
prohibition on campus political activities:
The University will not allow students or others connected with it to use it to further their
non-university political or social or religious causes nor will it allow those outside the
University to use it for non-university purposes. The University will remain what it always has been-a University devoted to instruction, research and public service wherever

knowledge can serve society.
Speech by Clark Kerr (Spring 1964), quoted in BERKELEY REPORT, supra note 131, at 37.
During the protests, Kerr strongly supported the prohibition of political activity outside the main
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settings, educators were unpersuasive in stating the positive case for university autonomy from general legal norms.
Explosive changes at the nation's universities generated rapid change in
legal doctrine. 133 Beginning in 1961, courts decided a number of cases that
both afforded students basic rights of free expression and fair procedures
against state universities, and sought to discern the line beyond which the
university's traditional authority remained. The Supreme Court first addressed student free speech rights in Tinker v. Des Moines School District,134
a case involving junior high school students but often applied, and no doubt
intended to be applied, to university students.' 35
In Tinker, the Court held that school officials must permit students to
wear black armbands in class to protest the Viet Nam War, as long as the
wearing of the armbands did not create an uproar that disturbed classwork.' 36 The opinion could have held for the students on the narrow ground
that the school's principal impermissibly discriminated against the students'
viewpoint because he permitted many other symbols to be worn in class,
including the Iron Cross.' 37 Such a ruling would have established a significant precedent for students advocating unpopular viewpoints while postponing consideration of whether schools have educationally valid interests in the
manner in which students express their views. The Court's holding, however, went much further than this in two interesting respects.
First, Tinker explicitly rejected any distinction between the rights of students in class and out of class.' 38 Indeed, it justified recognition of student
gate and became the "chief adversary" of protesting students. BERKELEY REPORT, supra note 131,
at 47-48; Trillin, Letter from Berkeley, in REVOLUTION AT BERKELEY, supra note 131, at 258.
Berkeley students attacked Kerr for reasons that went far beyond his adherence to the political
speech rule. For protestors he represented the transformation of the university into a "universityfactory, run by a captain of the bureaucracy as a parts-supply shop to the profit system and the Cold
War complex." Draper, The Mind of Clark Kerr, in REVOLUTION AT BERKELEY, supra note 131,
at 70 (emphasis omitted). Kerr's position demonstrates vividly that the student demand for political rights within the university stemmed in part from the university's loss of moral authority consequent upon its inability to distinguish its mission and values from those of a larger society viewed as
corrupt by the students. It is central to my endeavor to regain for the university the appropriate
moral authority by insisting on the difference between academic speech and political speech.
133. See Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), rev'g, Dixon v. Alabama
State Bd. of Educ., 186 F. Supp. 945 (M.D. Ala. 1961). In Dixon, the state board expelled nine
black students from a black state college without a hearing for participating in a sit-in at a segregated lunch counter and in a protest march on the state capitol. Dixon, 186 F. Supp. at 947-48.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court's upholding of the
dismissal and remanded for consideration of due process concerns.
134. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
135. See, e.g., Board of Trustees v. Fox, 110 S. Ct. 3028, 3039 (1989); Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973) (per curiam); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972).
136. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
137. Id. at 510-11.
138. Id. at 512-13.
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free speech rights on school property by quoting from the Court's then recent
opinion affirming a constitutional right of academic freedom, which rhetorically proclaimed that "[t]he classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of
ideas.' -139 Thus, the Court held that the very nature of education embraces
free expression, and that free speech was students' right not only in the classroom during classtime but throughout the campus and at all hours. The
Court justified this extension by noting the educational value of "intercommunication" among students, 140 an observation undoubtedly true but which
confuses the rigors of structured instruction with the benefits of experience.
On the one hand, Tinker's merging of classroom and outer world lends
support to my insistence that student rights of free speech should be harmonized with the values of truth-seeking and courtesy required in the classroom. This support weakens, however, when one considers the inadequacies
of the Court's model of academic teaching as a "marketplace." While
academe does not compel any student to accept either methodologies or conclusions on the basis of the professors' status or authority, it rightfully insists
that the student's evaluation be based upon study and thoughtful reflection.
In contrast, both the market and the democratic polity accept the preference
of the buyer or the voter merely because she holds it. Tinker's account of
classroom speech seriously neglects intellectual standards. The Court seems
to read the values of democratic politics into the classroom rather than to
draw from academic values an appreciation of student extracurricular
speech. This confusion submerges the contrast between academic and political speech that bedevils this area and resurfaces ominously in later cases
4
denying students any legal freedoms in curricular speech.1 '
Second, the Court stated that student free speech could be prohibited only
when it "materially and substantially interfere[s]" with educational activities. 142 This legal standard reflects the Court's mistaken belief that academic
and political speech are a single currency of communication; there is no overriding fear about incommensurability or about bad money driving out good.
The only rules necessary for accommodation of academic and political
speech, the Court seems to imply, are those of time, place, and manner.
Thus, black armbands must be permitted in the classroom, quite irrespective
of the subject being taught, as long as they do not hinder students from performing their assigned tasks. The emphasis is on the capacity of faculty and
students to carry on the tasks assigned them at the precise moment the student speech occurs. Thus, the grounds for regulation are physical or auditory interference, or a message so sensational that the audience fails to
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
Id
See infra notes 171-75 and accompanying text.
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
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proceed with the prescribed instructional program.143
Why did the Court give such a broad scope to student political speech?
Any suggested answer must be speculative, but surely the appropriate limits
of student protest must have seemed to the justices to have been the pressing
issue of the day. The Court certainly demonstrated its awareness of student
protest by citing in the text of Tinker two leading district court opinions
protecting student expression. 144
Justice Fortas, who authored the Tinker opinion, had recently published a
small book, ConcerningDissent and Civil Disobedience,' 45 which he wrote so
"as many people as possible should understand the basic principles governing
dissent and civil disobedience."' 146 The book justifies prosecuting even wellintentioned protestors who turn violent or injure other people or property
primarily on the ground that the United States Constitution affords all citizens extensive rights of peaceful free speech. 147 The prose resonates with
anxiety about the extent of student disaffection from American institutions;
he describes the youth revolt as "new and shocking... more disturbing than
the Negro revolution to which it is dynamically related." 14 In his chapter
entitled "Revolt of Youth," Fortas portrays protesting students as unaware
143. The Court drew this limitation from companion cases decided by the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit. In the first of these cases, Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966), the
court held that the principal of an all-black high school in Philadelphia, Mississippi, in 1964, could
not prohibit students from wearing "freedom buttons" at school when the authorities could point to
no actual disruption of the school's routine caused by the buttons. Id. at 748-49. In the second,
Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966), decided on the same day
and by the same panel as Burnside, the court refused to enjoin the principal of another all-black
high school who had prohibited the wearing of similar buttons, when the proponents of the buttons
had harassed other students and caused "an unusual degree of commotion, boisterous conduct, a
collision with the rights of others, an undermining of authority, and a lack of order, discipline, and
decorum." Id. at 754. The Tinker Court repeatedly cited these cases and explicitly accepted the
distinction they drew. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
144. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513-14 (citing Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613
(M.D. Ala. 1967); Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967)).
145. A. FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (1st ed. 2d. printing 1968).
146. Id. at vi.
147. Justice Fortas concluded his chapter on civil disobedience by stating:
Violence is never defensible-and it has never succeeded in securing massive reform in an
open society where there were alternative methods of winning the minds of others to one's
cause and securing changes in the government or its policies. In the United States these
avenues are certainly available.
Id. at 40 (emphasis in original). Later he concluded more generally:
So long as our governments obey the mandate of the Constitution and assure facilities and
protection for the powerful expression of individual and mass dissent, the disobedience of
laws which are themselves not the target of the protest-the violation of law merely as a
technique of demonstration--constitutes an act of rebellion, not merely of dissent.
Id. at 63.
148. Id. at 60.
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of the righteousness of the state's insistence on conformity to fair rules. His
basic lesson for youth is that while the student protesting the war or actions
by university administration has extensive constitutionally protected rights
to express his views, "he is not entitled to immunity if he directly and willfully incites violence or insists on deliberately disrupting the work or movement of others."' 4 9 Justice Fortas thought it was important that citizens,
especially university students, understand that a robust right of free speech
renders illegitimate a protester's resort to disruption and violence. The first
amendment is a safety valve against revolution both because it gives angry
protestors a protected outlet and because it justifies defense of the established
order. The prominence of these concerns in the minds of the Justices probably best explains why Tinker was written in such broad and fervid terms that
emphasized the centrality of free speech rights and the appropriate power of
school officials to deal with real disruption. 50
By the time the Court decided Healy v. James15 1 in 1972, the credible
threat of mass student revolt seemed to have passed, but the memory of the
threat persisted. Indeed, Healy commences with a panoramic recollection of
the violent and disordered scene on American campuses in the years 19691970, which is contrasted with "the calmer atmosphere and greater maturity" that prevailed at the time of the opinion. 52 In Healy, the Court held
that a state college could deny official recognition to a chapter of Students for
a Democratic Society (SDS) only if the radical student group refused to abide
by reasonable rules of conduct designed to safeguard "the traditional academic atmosphere." 1 53 The opinion is the culmination of several years of
federal court wrestling with the constitutional implications of student protest
and radicalism. Justice Powell's fine opinion exudes sweet reasonableness
and tolerance, as if pouring balm on the rancor and intolerance he portrays
as having recently ravaged the nations' campuses. The Court ruled that insofar as the refusal of recognition stemmed from antipathy to the views of SDS
or from general concerns about the disruption an SDS chapter might cause,
it violated the students' freedom of association, but that denial was permissi149. Id. at 46.
150. Another partial explanation for the tenor of the opinion is that Justice Fortas was engaged
at the time in a dispute concerning the dimensions of the public forum doctrine. In his plurality
opinion in Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (plurality opinion), he had "planted the seeds
for a revolutionary theory . . . that the right to a public forum could extend, in at least some
instances, even to publicly owned property that manifestly was not historically dedicated to the
exercise of First Amendment rights." Stone, ForaAmericana, Speech in Public Places, 1974 Sup.
Cr. REv. 233, 247 (footnote omitted). It would have been surprising, therefore, if Justice Fortas
had resisted the impulse to emphasize those aspects of Tinker that focused on speech on school
property, rather than the more mundane viewpoint discrimination of the principal.
151. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
152. Id. at 172.
153. Id. at 194 & n.24.
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ble to the extent it was based on a refusal to promise to obey, or actual viola1 54
tion of, valid conduct regulations.
Healy is no more subtle than Tinker in demarcating academic from political speech. The Court again invokes the image of the classroom as the
"marketplace of ideas" and seems to assert that the existence of academic
freedom on campus necessitates a wide reading of students' free speech
rights. Because of its blindness to the difference between academic and political speech, the Court is able to justify the limits of the right to free speech in
terms of the speech-conduct distinction, viewing the rules that SDS had to
follow as essentially conduct rules. Yet, as I have insisted, the university sets
many standards for academic speech, and disruption of a classroom, the specific fear concerning SDS, may also be accomplished by vigorously expressed
ignorance or contempt, or by lethargic silence.
Tinker and Healy represent the Court's fullest considerations of student
speech outside the curriculum. Do they preclude university prohibition of
racial insults? Actually, they seem largely beside the point. One sees in these
cases a determination by the Court to blaze a broad field for student free
speech, no doubt in part from conviction, but also in an attempt to fortify the
frontier against intimidation and violence. The positive case for affording
students rights against their universities stood on the widespread impression
that contemporary students were unprecedentedly mature, politicized, and
idealistic. Persuading these students of the justice of American institutions,
such as the Constitution, and of the damage to these institutions from unchecked civil disobedience, focused judicial attention on the line between
protected civil liberty and prohibited disruption. At the same time, the
amorphous character of the American university of the time, the so called
"multi-versity," 155 facilitated the Court's slighting of the distinctive values of
academe.
The social and educational context within which we grapple with racial
insults on campus is far different today. Now the danger on campuses comes
not from disruption by committed radical students, but from the intellectual
sloth and indifference of well-meaning students eager for the certification
that can lead to financial security. Racial insults do not emerge from a radical critique of existing institutions, but from the inability of students to transform their own insecurity into intelligible propositions about the world
around them. These students need education, not liberty. At the same time,
minority students must be able to believe that the university stands for an
intellectual culture that transcends ethnic origins. Finally, for the university
itself, now seeking to regain a moral coherence that transcends service to the
154. Id. at 171-72.
155. See supra note 132.
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post-industrial economy, insistence on standards for reasoned and courteous
15 6
interchange clarifies the ethical foundation for teaching and scholarship.
The Sixties are over. The Constitution should not hold the rules of student
speech in a form molded by the contentiousness of the past.
This does not mean, however, that Tinker or Healy are incorrect within
their own context, or should be abridged. The limit that they set on student
free speech-interference with the educational endeavor-permits prohibition of racial insults, if one accepts the that the university validly may protect
standards of discourse and the academic values they further. Both of these
opinions can accommodate such a perspective. Tinker of course addressed
political speech, not rank insult; more importantly, however, it addressed
speech that did not "involve... invasion of the rights of others." 157 Because
university officials reasonably can conclude that racial insults lack intellectual content and harm the educational rights of target students, Tinker does
not prevent their prohibition. Moreover, I would also argue that the harm
racial insults inflict on the tone of discourse within the university community
"materially disrupts classwork," taking "classwork" figuratively to mean the
process of education, and therefore justifies disciplinary authority. Admittedly, this interpretation of Tinker departs from its spirit of broad campus
freedom, but such departure seems justified by the different context and
meaning of racial insults and black armbands.
Room can also be found within Healy for a principled exception for racial
insults. The Court not only forbade the university from banning SDS because of the organization's advocacy of the use of force and disruption on
campus, but also reaffirmed the university's authority to enact regulations to
safeguard the traditional academic atmosphere and to ban the organization if
it failed to follow proper regulations. 5 8 The Court made clear that the stu156. This renewal of purpose also includes some readmission of the university's responsibility for
the moral development of its students. See D. BOK, BEYOND THE IVORY TOWER 307-09 (1982);
Gregory & Ballau, In Loco ParentisReinventis: Is There Still a ParentingFunction in Higher Education?, 24 NASPA J. 28 (1986); Morrill & Mount, In Loco ParentisRevisited4 CHANGE, Jan.-Feb.
1986, at 34. While justified by the university's traditional commitment to humanism, this welcome
development avoids the heavy hand of the in locoparentisregime with its disciplinary enforcement.
Rather, contemporary universities offer programs of information, counseling, and community service that more appropriately address the uneven maturity of college students and also the
nonparental educational mission of the school. The fostering of supportive race relations among
students easily fits within this endeavor.
157. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
158. Healy, 408 U.S. at 193-94. A brief amicus curiae filed by a group of university presidents
and co-authored by Professor Philip Kurkland did argue that the university should be free to establish higher standards of speech and decorum than the society at large because "a university is a
distinctive and fragile institution expressly devoted to dispassionate inquiry and the orderly transmission of knowledge." Brief of the American Association of Presidents of Independent Colleges
and Universities, amicus curiae, at 11, Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (No. 71-452) (citing S.
HOOK, ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND ACADEMIC ANARCHY (1969)). The Court may have concluded
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dent group could be punished not for its philosophy, but only for acting on
its philosophy in a way that infringed upon the rights of others. A racial
insult does not state a reasoned proposition about race relations, but instead
acts upon instincts about racial identity in a way that damages academic
freedom and injures victims. Thus, Healy offers no hindrance to the adoption of a rule that would serve goals encompassed by academic freedom
through the prohibition of racial insults, but it would protect the right of a
student to argue, for example, that racial insults should be protected by the
Constitution, or that prohibitions of them demonstrate the power of liberal
orthodoxy. In applying both Tinker and Healy, the difficulty is in seeing that
the language of contempt and hatred can "disrupt" higher education just as
seriously as can heckling speakers or barricading classrooms, even if the
harm is less immediate or specifically sited.
Somewhat less amenable to this interpretation is the Court's 1973 opinion
in Papish v. Board of Curators,159 in which the Court summarily reversed
lower court rulings upholding the dismissal of a graduate student for hawking an underground newspaper on campus, the front page of which contained
a cartoon showing policemen raping the Statue of Liberty and the Goddess
of Justice, and a headline containing the word "motherfucker."' 16 0 The
Court held that the university had no special power to curtail the disseminabecause their expression failed to adhere to
tion of ideas on campus merely
"conventions of decency."' 6 1 The Court viewed the case as controlled by
Cohen v. California162 and its progeny, thereby implicitly denying the university greater authority to regulate the quality of speech than the state itself.
Indeed, the Court suggested that to allow the university such power would
create a "dual standard."' 16 3 In response to the argument that Tinker and
Healy left room for the school to set standards for the manner in which a
student expressed herself, the Court emphasized that the choice of language
came within the "content" of her speech, and that "in the absence of any
disruption of campus order or interference with the rights of others, the sole
that its acknowledgement of the university's broad power to regulate conduct obviated the need to
consider whether the university had any special interest in the speech of its students.
159. 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (per curiam).
160. Id. at 667-68. Evaluation of the severity of the sanction enforced against Papish must take
into account her marginal connection to the university. She had been a graduate student in journalism for six years and had taken mostly courses in ceramics in the recent past. She had been on
disciplinary probation for five years for distributing on campus publications of the Students for a
Democratic Society (containing the usual objectional words), a punishment no less unconstitutional
than her ultimate expulsion. Moreover, by the time of her dismissal, she was on academic probation and would have been dismissed for academic reasons had she not been dismissed on disciplinary grounds. Papish v. Board of Curators, 464 F.2d 136, 138-39 & n.3, 141-42 (8th Cir. 1972),
rev'd, 410 U.S. 667 (1973).
161. Papish, 410 U.S. at 670.
162. 403 U.S. 15 (1971); see supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
163. Papish, 410 U.S. at 671.

1991]

RACIAL INSULTS AND FREE SPEECH

issue was whether a state university could prescribe this form of
expression."164
The testy response of the Court is understandable: underground newspapers were an important means of expression for the student movement of the
late 1960s and early 1970s, and sexually explicit images and forbidden words,
evidenced by numerous classic rock lyrics, expressed a cultural truth about
the rejection of traditional barriers. Nonetheless, the Court surely botched
the opinion in Papish. Although it reached the correct result, the Court further muddled the constitutional status of student speech. I will first explain
why I think the result is correct and then explain why I think the reasoning
is harmful.
There are a host of problems with the university's punishment of Papish
that the Court passes over. First, both the cartoon and the headline were
core political speech, the first criticizing the violence perpetrated on demonstrators by the Chicago police during the summer of 1968, and the second
describing the acquittal of the members of a radical group called "Up
Against the Wall, Motherfucker." 1 65 In the first case, the concededly objectionable cartoon directly expressed anger and fear about the use of force by
the police to stifle dissent; in the second, the headline repeated the vulgar
word because it was the name of the newsworthy organization. In neither
case is the university's squeamishness credible. There must be occasions
where the use of the word "motherfucker" is acceptable in intellectual discourse (unfortunately, I have used it several times myself to analyze Papish).
Furthermore, the university never explained why Papish's newspaper was
"indecent,"' 66 and, without some such explanation, a court would lack a ba164. Id. at 671 & n.6.
165. Id. at 620.
166. This fact distinguishes Papish from Goldberg v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App.
2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967), in which the court sustained the dismissal of a student for frequently saying "fuck" and similar terms in addressing demonstrations on the campus. The court in
Goldberg drew the very distinction that the Supreme Court failed to make in Papish:
Plaintiffs contention that the words were used only in the context of their demonstration is
not borne out by the record which indicates that the terms were used repeatedly, and often
out of context, or when used in context given undue emphasis. The conduct of the plaintiffs thus amounted to coercion rather than persuasion.
Id. at 880, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 473; see also Wright, supra note 128, at 1057-58.
An incident with which I am familiar illustrates how student expression that at first appears
racist might be explained satisfactorily by context. Workers in a college duplication shop were
making copies of a crude looking student publication when they noticed that it contained a story
about a sheriff shooting a black man, which was headlined "Nigger Brought to Justice," and an
editorial insisting on the inferiority of blacks. The angry workers refused to make any more copies
and forwarded the original to the office of the dean of students. Officials in the dean's office also
were incensed and called in the student who was named as editor on the masthead. Just before the
student was to arrive, however, the dean of students, who was to conduct the interview, noticed that
the paper, named the Jefferson Reporter, was dated August 3, 1933, and the black man shot was
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from the good faith exersis to conclude that the disciplinary action resulted
1 67
judgment.
academic
university's
the
of
cise
Second, the items in the newspaper that provoked the university's action
were not student speech but reprints of a cartoon and article from other radical publications. 168 Even though the university may demand that its members eschew offensive language, it cannot seal itself off from the outside
world. Students must be permitted to read and possess publications that employ the language of the street or fall below the ideals of reasoned discourse
to which the university aspires; any restrictions on outside publications can
be justified only by persuasive educational reasons.' 69 Moreover, the university already had given permission for the newspaper in question to be distributed at some locations on the campus. The university seemed to object
because the distribution of an issue containing objectionable material occurred near a memorial to deceased graduates; it failed, however, to justify
70 Both of
its complaint in terms of a time, place, or manner restriction.'
these problems in the proceedings provided the Court with a basis for setting
aside the university's actions without resorting to sweeping pronouncements
about the inability of the university to make any content distinctions.
Papish should never have been rendered as a per curiam opinion in a summary reversal. The Court's prior decisions had been vague about the point at
which expression would begin to conflict with the educational program of the
university.' 7' Papish seems to hold that "disruption of higher education"
means only the bullhorn outside the classroom window or inside the library
reading room. Nowhere has the Court offered substantial justification for
such a narrow scope for the university's concern about the quality of campus
named Joe Christmas. As it turned out, the paper was being prepared by the student for a seminar
on William Faulkner in order to represent for the class the social and racial attitudes of Faulkner's
fictional county.
167. Difficult questions involving the political use of racially insulting language often occur. A
difficult case with which I am familiar involved an Irish student group that advertised a meeting
concerning discrimination against Catholics in Northern Ireland with a poster containing the headline, "Nigger of the North." Black students complained to the dean about the posters. When informed of the objection of the blacks, the Irish students expressed surprise, apologized, and
amended the posters with less offensive headlines. What if they had insisted on displaying their
original posters? The actual outcome in these difficult cases strikes me as significantly less impor-

tant than the care and process by which the university goes about resolving them.
168. Papish, 410 U.S. at 667.
169. Universities do have some power to keep the tawdry influences of popular culture at bay.
For example, commercial solicitation can be prohibited in dormitories. See Board of Trustees v.
Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028 (1989). I would think that a university could also prohibit, among other
things, the screening of what used to be called stag films, the keeping of a television set in a freshman dormitory room, or the sale of People magazine in the student union on the grounds that these
things would unduly interfere with an atmosphere conducive to serious thought.
170. Papish, 410 U.S. at 670 n.6.
171. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 188-91 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-14 (1969).
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expression, a failing that implies an anti-intellectual and philistine conception
of higher education.
Universities do have the competence for, and a purpose in, holding students to standards of discourse that the state itself does not. The function of
universities is to sharpen expression so that the speaker may put forward her
best argument and listeners may be able to separate the credible from the
unfounded in the speaker's presentation. The university need not be agnostic
about the value of rational discourse or the standards of civil communication; these strictures do not suppress the expression of any point of view, but
only force it into a form in which it can be dealt with on its merits. The first
amendment does not force the university to accept from its members speech
that is lazy, ignorant, or half-baked, nor to tolerate speech that is vulgar or
abusive, for these failings hamper productive discourse.
This is all clear enough when the speech occurs in a strictly academic setting, such as in a scholarly paper or student exercise. No one doubts that
Papish could have been given a failing grade for a journalism or political
science exercise which referred to Ronald Reagan as a "motherfucker."
Quite without regard to her political preferences, a professor could reasonably conclude that such vilification demonstrates incompetence as a political
writer (even though some individuals might disagree). The Court's recent
cases have clearly established this point; schools may exercise sweeping powers to sanction students for speech occurring in curricular contexts. Thus,
the Court has approved the authority of a high school to punish a student for
making a "lewd" speech at an official school assembly1 72 and to forbid publication of stories about student sexual practices in a school newspaper published as part of a journalism class.1 73 These cases avoid the sweep of prior
cases by creating a bright line between extra-curricular speech, where Tinker,
Healy, and Papish protect rights equivalent to those of citizens in society at
large, and curricular speech where the rights of public citizens have no
relevance.
This dichotomy seems mistakenly rigid. The Court permits schools to
place restrictions on speech within the curriculum that may have minimal
bearing on valid educational objectives,1 74 but denies the school's educational interest in the character of the speech that a student engages in outside
of academic exercises. The educational incoherence of this doctrine is manifest when one recalls that Tinker derived the student's right of free expres172. Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
173. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
174. The standard for regulation of speech within the curriculum articulated by the Hazelwood
Court provides: "educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over
the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." Id at 273. The adoption of a
rational relationship test suggests effective abandonment of constitutional supervision.
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sion from prior decisions that inaccurately characterized academic freedom
as multilateral freedom of expression within the classroom. These cases
bring students to the point where they have no rights in the vital crucible of
the classroom, 75 but have, in the views of some, an apparent constitutional
right to burn the books of a disfavored professor or burn a cross in front of a
black fraternity so long as they do not violate the fire code. What is urgently
needed is a more sensitive approach that pursues the educational interests of
the university in regulating student speech throughout the academic environment, but that limits institutional authority to instances in which the university has a valid educational concern. A university should be able to prohibit
racial insults because they are inconsistent with the rational search for truth,
substitute rancor and ranting for evidence and argument, destroy the mutual
courtesy that embodies respect for a reasonable adversary, and divert the
victim of such speech from the intellectual work that the university provides
her.
V.

CONCLUSION

In the above analysis I have attempted to prove that the Constitution can
and should be read to afford universities the authority to prohibit racial insults by members of the academic community. It does not follow from this,
however, that every college and university should explicitly proscribe racial
insults. Although such a rule might effectively stem verbal abuse, each
school must carefully consider whether such regulations would likely be effective in its setting and whether any benefits so gained would exceed the
undoubted costs of such regulation of speech. Permit me to expand on these
prudential considerations.
Disciplinary rules are the least effective way that a university can enhance
the quality of speech or foster racial tolerance among its members. The educational program must celebrate and instruct its students in the beauty and
usefulness of graceful and accurate speech and writing; a liberal education
should leave students intolerant of propaganda and commercial manipulation, and competent to directly and forcefully express coherent views as citizens. Such teaching is not amoral; the graduate ought freely to prefer the
exercise of skill, reflective perception, and an abiding curiosity to desires for
175. This situation would be acceptable if there were functioning understandings of student academic freedom prevalent in the nation's schools. However, neither constitutional law nor educational custom has generated usable theories of student academic freedom either in higher or basic
education. See Byrne, supra note 5, at 262-63. University students are generally protected by academic norms against indoctrination, but they would benefit from elaboration of rights in the learning process, such as evaluation without bias or opportunities for comment. For elementary and
secondary students, the situation is more complex. See Roe, Valuing Student Speech: The Work of
the Schools As Conceptual Development, CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 1991).
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acquisition, consumption, and domination. Without the university's consistent action on a commitment to reasoned discourse as central to its mission,
the university's attempt to prohibit insulting or lewd speech may seem a hypocritical denial of its own failings.
Similarly, prohibiting racial insults will advance racial harmony on a campus only when the university has effectively committed itself to educate lovingly the members of every ethnic group. Although nearly every university
admits minority students using criteria that aspire in good faith to be fair,
many have failed to transform themselves into truly multi-ethnic institutions.
Not to have succeeded at this daunting task does not merit reproach; the
university's origins and traditions are explicitly European, growth and accommodation to the extent required to create a multi-ethnic community
must take time and witness false steps. However, not to have made plain
that blacks, hispanics, Asians, Indians, and others who have been excluded in
the past are not only now welcome, but are requested to collaborate in shaping new university structures and mores so that the benefits of advanced education will be available without regard to birth and so that the university can
continue to spawn for a changing society a cosmopolitan culture based on
reason and reflection standing above tribal fears and blind desires, not to
have begun this work in earnest merits regret and will provoke anger. Universities that pass rules against racial insults which are not part of a comprehensive commitment to ethnic integration will serve only to exacerbate racial
tensions.
Schools that adopt prohibitions on racially offensive speech ought to enforce them with restraint. Certainly, when students have sought to intimidate or frighten other students with racial insults, the school should treat this
behavior as a fundamental breach of university standards meriting the
strongest punitive measures. But often insulting expressions will result from
insensitivity or ignorance; complaints about such behavior should be seen as
opportunities for teaching, and creative informal measures that make the offenders aware of the harmful consequences and injustice of their behavior
should be pursued. The school should also provide succor to the victim
whose hurt and anger must be acknowledged and meliorated. But severely
punishing ignorant young people for expressions inherited from their parents
or neighborhoods may serve to harden. and focus their sense of grievance,
create martyrs, and prolong racial animosity. Deans who administer such
rules must overcome their personal repugnance at racist speech and enforce
the rules for the benefit of the entire community. Controversial interpretative application of the rules should be placed in the hands of faculty and
students representative of the entire institution, and the accused, the victim,
and the dean should have an opportunity to express their perspectives.
A recurrent concern regarding rules against racial insults is their vague-
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ness and overbreadth. These, of course, were the bases upon which the University of Michigan's policy was declared unconstitutional, although the
demonstrated propensity of the school to apply the policy to presumptively
protected speech appears to have steered the Court's conclusions on these
issues.17 6 In general, university disciplinary rules rarely are struck down for
vagueness; courts usually permit universities to regulate student conduct on
the basis of generally stated norms, so long as they give fair notice of the
behavior proscribed. 177 Courts generally are more strict regarding vagueness
in rules that affect speech, in no small part because of the distrust of the
78
competence and motives of the government censor.1
A central argument of this article has been that the university can be
trusted to administer rules prohibiting racial insults because it has the proper
moral basis and adequate expertise to do so. It is not surprising, therefore,
that I believe that vagueness concerns about such university rules are largely
misplaced. This is not to deny that a university should adopt safeguards to
protect accused students from the concerns that the courts have highlighted.
First, the rules should state explicitly that no one may be disciplined for the
good faith statement of any proposition susceptible to reasoned response, no
matter how offensive. The possibility that punishment is precluded by this
limitation should be addressed at every stage of the disciplinary process. Second, some response between punishment and acquittal should be available
when the university concludes that the speaker was subjectively unaware of
the offensive character of his speech; these cases seem to present mainly educational concerns. Third, all controversial issues of interpretation of the
rules should be entrusted to a panel of faculty and students who are representative of the institution. Rules furthering primarily academic concerns about
the quality of speech and the development of students should be given meaning by those most directly concerned with the academic enterprise rather
than by administrators who may register more precisely external political
pressures on the university. Given these safeguards and a comprehensible
definition of an unacceptable insult, such as the one ventured in the introduction to this article,179 a court which accepts the underlying proposition that a
university has the constitutional authority to regulate racial insults should
not be troubled independently by vagueness.
A difficult prudential consideration is whether a university should decline
to regulate insults because of public criticism that censorship demeans the
176. See Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
177. Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1088-90 (8th Cir. 1969) (Blackmun,
J.); W. KAPLIN, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION 292-94 (1985).

178. See G. STONE., L. SEIDMAN, C. SuNSTEiN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITuTIONAL LAW 104347 (1986).
179. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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very intellectual virtues towards which the university strives, such as the superiority of persuasion over compulsion. Obviously, the adoption of such
regulation has brought forth sincere and bitter criticism from many friends of
higher education-the Economist, for example, went so far as to call such
regulations "disgraceful."'' 8 0 To some extent these criticisms stem from misunderstanding about the character of academic speech and the goals of
prohibitions on racial insult, but universities should admit that turning to
regulation marks a sad failure in civility. A failure already has occurred,
however, when students scurrilously demean other students because of their
race. The university at this point can only choose among evils. It would not
be true to its traditions if it did not come down on the side of protecting the
educational environment for blameless students against wanton and hurtful
ranting.
Universities which decide that broad prohibitions of racial insults are necessary should not confine their regulations to the narrow ambit of authority
gleaned from the fighting words doctrine. A school should welcome the opportunity to persuade a court that it has misconceived the nature of the university as being neutral about the quality of the speech of its students.
Universities have suffered at the bar from a reluctance or inability to present
themselves as institutions devoted to indigenous principles, and have sought
instead to fit themselves within rules developed for other social entities such
as business corporations. Universities should be willing to defend their
unique status in society; after all, losing on an issue of academic principle is
no more blameworthy for a university than it would be for a religion seeking
to preserve a practice disapproved by secular society. The virtues of scholarship and teaching may be overshadowed in an angry and greedy society, but
they will be preserved only by the refusal of academics to surrender their
sense of mission.
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